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Statue of Plato by Pisano; Siena, Duomo, (1280) |
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Statue of Plato by Pisano; Siena, Duomo, (1280) |
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Theory of FORMS
/ IDEAS
μορφή/morphē; ἰδέα/idea;
εἶδος/eidos
Originally a way of understanding language; becomes a form of metaphysics
Distinction Between
NOUS
/ DIANOIA
νοῦς
(νόος)/nous;
διάνοια/dianoia
Contemplative Faculty /
Reasoning Brain
NOESIS: Direct apprehension; intuitive comprehension
Aristotle: says of noesis that it is a participation in the object apprehended; subject-object relationship vanishes
Christians will later say PRAYER is an act of the NOUS: (not that prayer is act of INTELLECT in modern sense); rather an exercise of the contemplative faculty
DIANOESIS: Reasoning; sequential; used in Euclidean geometry
CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE
Highest Life for BOTH Plato and Aristotle
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PLATO (427-347 BC), Greek philosopher. He was a pupil of Socrates. After Socrates execution (399), he left Athens. Some time after 388 he returned ans established a school on the outskirts of the city near the grove saced to Academus (hence the academy). Apart from one brief interlude, he seems to have spent the last 40 years of his life at the Academy. With the exception of a small collection of letters, Plato’s writings are in the form of Dialogues. Socrates if often the main speaker, with various critics or pupils, after whom the different dialogues are named, taking part in the discussion. |
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In the earlier Dialogues the main emphasis is ethical. They insist that the cultivation of mind and will, “goodness of soul”, is the chief business of life; that this is attained by a rational insight into the nature of goodness, truth, and beauty; that morality and the claims of the enlightened conscience are to be respected in political life; and that the rational moral personality is created by the “recollection” of what the soul knows of these values. Since the soul naturally aims at what it believes to be good, wrongdoing is the pursuit of a falsely conceived good.
These doctrines are based on a metaphysic which is developed especially in the later Dialogues. This contrasts the world of sense and everyday experience with the true or higher world of `Ideas” (or better “Forms”). These “Forms” are “present to” individual entities, and by grasping the eternal Forms and participating in them the soul attains its true well-being and is lifted above the flux of “becoming”. But the highest value, the “Form of the Good” remains mysterious.
Plato”s main discussions of theology in the narrower sense are in the Timaeus and Book 10 of the Laws. The Timaeus describes how the divine Demiurge brings the world into being, how He makes it as an image of an eternal archetype, and how He enables it to share in His perfection by putting into it mind and soul. The Laws, Book 10, embodies the earliest known exposition of natural theology, namely a form of the cosmological argument based on the belief that all motions ultimately require at their head a “perfectly good soul”. It remains obscure how Plato related the highest of the Forms to God as the Supreme Soul. In the Timaeus the Forms are the thoughts of God, but, since God also created the universe after the pattern of the Forms, He would seem in some sense subordinate to them. It was, however, only among the more theologically interested Platonists of a later generation that the problem became a matter of debate.
(Adapted from E.A. Livingstone, Concise Dictionary of the Christian Church, Oxford, 2000, p. 455-456)
PLATONISM:
Plato’s doctrines had a wide following in the Hellenistic age and made an impact on later Judaism, evident in the Book of Wisdom and the writings of Philo (the chief representative of Middle Platonism). In the 3rd cent. AD a recasting of Plato’s system by Plotinus (Neoplatonism) was developed by Porphyry (c. 232-c.305) in conscious opposition to Christianity. Proclus (d.485) was the last head of th Academy and a celebrated commentator on Plato.
The beginnings of an interweaving of Platonism with Christian thought go back to Clement of Alexandria and Origen. More important for Christian theology was the influence of Platonic doctrines on St Augustine, whose authority did much to secure for many Platonic notions a permanent place in Latin Christianity. Henceforth the Platonic Forms were regularly interpreted as the creative thoughts of God. The relevance of Platonism for Christian mysticism was appreciated by Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and other spiritual writers of both East. and West. The Renaissance led to a revival of interest in Plato himself, and Platonic influences have continued to play an important part in Christian philosophy, especially in England. On the Continent Protestant orthodoxy, with its distrust of natural reason, has commonly been hostile to Platonism and in the l6th cent. there was theological criticism of Greek metaphysics.
(Adapted from E.A. Livingstone, Concise Dictionary of the Christian Church, Oxford, 2000, p. 455)
This Webpage was created for a workshop held at Saint Andrew's Abbey, Valyermo, California in 1990
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Furioso |
1. DEFINITIONS; 2. PLATO’S TRIPARTITE SOUL; 3. VIRTUES AND VICES of the TRIPARTITE SOUL ; 4. ARISTOTLE on VIRT UE as BALANCE; 5.VIRTUE AS SPIRITUAL WARFARE; 6. EVAGRIUS, GREGORY and AQUINAS
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1) DEFINITIONS |
1) Liddell and Scott. An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon. Oxford. Clarendon Press. 1889.ISBN: 0199102066; 2) Henry George Liddell. Robert Scott. A Greek-English Lexicon. revised and augmented throughout by. Sir Henry Stuart Jones. with the assistance of. Roderick McKenzie. Oxford. Clarendon Press. 1940.ISBN: 0198642261;
VIRTUE: ἀρετή / aretē [Latin: virtus]
1. goodness, excellence, of any kind, esp. of manly qualities, manhood, valour, prowess, Hom., Hdt. [1like Lat. vir-tus, from vir / man]; [2. rank, nobility, Theogn., Eur.]
3. in Prose, generally, goodness, excellence in any art, Plat., etc.; of animals or things, Hdt., attic.
4. in moral sense, goodness, virtue, Plat., etc.:--also character for virtue, merit, Eur., etc.
5. service done him, Thuc.; Xen.
VICE: κακία / kakía [Latin: vitium]
1. badness in quality, opp. to ἀρετή / aretē, excellence, pl. defects, Luc.
2. cowardice, sloth, Thuc., Plat.
3. moral badness, wickedness, vice, Plat., Xen.
[4. ill-repute, Thuc.; 5. evil suffered, Ntest.]
AS ἀρετή / aretē is not used in the New Testament in the sense of the Stoic doctrine of virtue, so κακία / kakía is not used in the sense of the Greek doctrine of vice. [...] κακία is a force which destroys fellowship.
Walter Grundmann ,Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, G. Kittel, tr. G. W. Bromiley & G. Friedrich, . Eerdmans: Grand Rapids, MI
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2) PLATO’S TRIPARTITE SOUL |
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REASON |
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logistikon / hegemonikon nous / logos / intellectus contemplative faculty PRUDENCE/phronēsis |
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DESIRE epithumetikon epithumia concupiscientia longing TEMPERANCE/sophrosunē
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STRENGTH
thumikon irascible / orectic courage / zeal COURAGE/andrea |
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JUSTICE/dikaiosunē |
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THE
ORDERING
(AND MASTERY) OF THE
SOUL
ACCORDING
TO PLATO
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OF the nature of the soul, [...] let me speak briefly, and in a figure. |
[...] ταύτῃ οὖν λέγωμεν. |
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And let the figure be composite - a pair of winged horses and a charioteer. [...] |
ἐοικέτω δὴ συμφύτῳ δυνάμει ὑποπτέρου ζεύγους τε καὶ ἡνιόχου. |
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the human charioteer drives his in a pair; and one of them is noble and of noble breed, and the other is ignoble and of ignoble breed;and the driving of them of necessity gives a great deal of trouble to him. (Phaedrus 246a; Hofstadter & Kuhns; Harv. U. Press, 1964, p. 57) |
καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἡμῶν ὁ ἄρχων συνωρίδος ἡνιοχεῖ͵ εἶτα τῶν ἵππων ὁ μὲν αὐτῷ καλός τε καὶ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων͵ ὁ δ΄ ἐξ ἐναντίων τε καὶ ἐναντίος· |
| In the conflict of the soul, spirit (thumoeidos) is arrayed on the side of the rational principle (logistikon) [...] | 440.e.6 θυμοειδοῦς [...] αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς στάσει τίθεσθαι τὰ ὅπλα πρὸς τὸ λογιστικόν. |
| Ought not the rational principle, which is wise and has the care of the whole soul, to rule, and the passionate or spirited principle (thumoeidos) to be the subject or ally? | 441.e.4-6 Οὐκοῦν τῷ μὲν λογιστικῷ ἄρχειν προσήκει͵ σοφῷ ὄντι καὶ ἔχοντι τὴν ὑπὲρ ἁπάσης τῆς ψυχῆς προμήθειαν͵ τῷ δὲ θυμοειδεῖ ὑπηκόῳ εἶναι καὶ συμμάχῳ τούτου; |
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And these two,
thus nourished and educated will rule over the concupiscent (epithumetikon),
which is in each of us the largest part of the soul and insatiable of gain. (Republic IV 440-442; pp. 704-706) |
Καὶ τούτω δὴ οὕτω τραφέντε καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τὰ αὑτῶν μαθόντε καὶ παιδευθέντε προστήσεσθον τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦὃ δὴ πλεῖστον τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἐστὶ καὶ χρημάτων φύσει ἀπληστότατονὃ τηρήσετον |
THE
ORDERING
(AND
CONTEMPLATIVE
UNION)
OF THE
SOUL,
ACCORDING
TO
ST.
GREGORY
OF
NYSSA
| Safety and security consists in marking the upper doorpost and the side posts of the entrance with the blood of the lamb. | 2.95.11-13 Φυλακὴ δέ ἐστι καὶ ἀσφάλεια τὸ τῷ αἵματι τοῦ ἀμνοῦ τήν τε φλιὰν καὶ τοὺς σταθμοὺς τῆς εἰσόδου κατασημήνεσθαι. |
| While in this way Scripture gives us through symbols a scientific understanding of the nature of the soul, secular learning also places it before the mind, dividing the soul into the rational (logistikon), the appetitive (epithumetikon), and the spirited (thumikon). Of these parts we are told below that the spirit and the appetite are placed below, supporting on each side the intellectual part of the soul, while the rational aspect (logos) is joined to both so as to keep them together and to be held up by them, being trained for courage by the spirit (thumos) and elevated to the participation in the Good (metousian tou agathou) by the appetite (epithumia). | 2.96.Ταῦτα περὶ ψυχῆς ἡμῖν φυσιολογοῦντος δι΄ αἰνιγμάτων τοῦ λόγου͵ καὶ ἡ ἔξωθεν παίδευσις ἐφαντάσθη͵ διαιροῦσα τὴν ψυχὴν εἴς τε τὸ λογιστικὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ θυμοειδές. Ἐκ τούτων δὲ τὸν θυμὸν μὲν καὶ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ὑποβεβηκέναι φασίν͵ ἑκατέρωθεν τὸ διανοητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ὑπερείδοντας͵ τὸν δὲ λογισμὸν ἀμφοτέροις ἐπεζευγμένον συνέχειν τε αὐτοὺς καὶ ὑπ΄ ἐκείνων ἀνέχεσθαι͵ πρὸς μὲν ἀνδρείαν τῷ θυμῷ στομούμενον͵ πρὸς δὲ τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μετουσίαν δι΄ ἐπιθυμίας ὑψούμενον. |
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As long, therefore, as the soul is kept safe in this manner, maintaining its firmness by virtuous thoughts as if by bolts, all the parts cooperate with one another for good. The rational for its part furnishes safety to its supports, and in its turn receives from them an equal benefit. The
Life of Moses II, 95-97, Meyendorf tr. |
2.97.῞εως ἂν οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σχήματι τούτῳ κατησφαλισμένη τύχῃ͵ καθάπερ τισὶ γόμφοις τοῖς κατ΄ ἀρετὴν νοήμασι τὸ βέβαιον ἔχουσα͵ ἐν πᾶσι δι΄ ἀλλήλων γίνεται ἡ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν συνεργία͵ παρέχοντος ἤδη δι΄ ἑαυτοῦ τοῖς ὑποβεβηκόσι τοῦ λογισμοῦ τὴν ἀσφάλειαν καὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει παρ΄ ἐκείνων τὴν ἴσην χάριν ἀντιλαμβάνοντος. |
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3) VIRTUES AND VICES of the TRIPARTITE SOUL |
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“All these kingdoms are mine [says the devil] … worship me and I will give them to you.” (Mt 4:9; Lk 4:6-7)
“You
shall worship the Lord your God, and him only shall you serve”. |
THE
LOGISTIKON
Reasoning, Contemplative Self
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VIRTUES |
MIND (Reason) nous / logos / intellectus |
VICES |
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understanding
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vainglory
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THE
PATHETIKON
Feeling Self, Subject to Emotions
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DESIRE |
STRENGTH |
| VIRTUES |
VICES |
VIRTUES |
VICES |
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abstinence temperance almsgiving |
gluttony |
courage endurance zeal enthusiasm |
cowardice |
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“Command these stones to become bread.”(Mt 4:3; Lk 4:3) Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceeds from the mouth of God.(Mt 4:4; Lk. 4:4) |
“Throw yourself down from here.” (Mt 4:6; Lk 4:9) You shall not tempt the Lord your God. (Mt. 4:7; Lk 4:12) |
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4) VIRTUE
AS BALANCE
(mean / midpoint) |
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[vice of] EXCESS |
[virtuous] MEAN |
[vice
of] |
[A] With regard to feelings of Fear and Confidence:
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Rashness |
Courage |
Cowardice |
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▲ |
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[B] With regard to Pleasures and Pains:
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Self-Indulgence |
Temperance |
Insensibility |
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▲ |
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[C] With regard to Truth:
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Boastfulness |
Truthfulness |
False Modesty |
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▲ |
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5) VIRTUE AS SPIRITUAL WARFARE |
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VIRTUE |
versus |
VICE |
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Prudence Temperance Courage Justice |
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Ignorance Lust Cowardice Injustice |
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THE SEVEN CAPITAL (“DEADLY”) SINS
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The Temptations of St. Antony |
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Gluttony (γαστριμαργία) |
Lust (luxuria) |
Lust (luxuria) |
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Lust (πορνεία) |
Gluttony (ventris ingluvies) |
Gluttony (ventris ingluvies) |
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Avarice (φιλαργυρία) |
Avarice (avaritia) |
Avarice (avaritia) |
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Sadness (λύπη) |
Gloominess (tristitia) |
“Sloth” (tristitia) |
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Anger (ὀργή) |
Anger (ira) |
Anger (ira) |
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Acedia (ἀκηδία) |
Envy (invidia) |
Envy (invidia) |
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Vainglory (κενοδοξία) |
Vainglory (inanis gloria) |
Vainglory/[=] Pride |
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Pride (ὑπερηφανία) |
Pride (superbia |
(inanis gloria = superbia) |
