THE  DIAGNOSIS AND CURE
of the
SOUL’S PASSIONS
ch. 1-10

 

 Hippocrates Examines a Patient
 Greek bas relief

Galen on the passions and errors of the soul Translated by Paul W. Harkins With an Introduction and Interpretation by Walther Riese 1963 Ohio State University Press Galeni de propriorum animi cuiuslibet affectuum dignotione et curatione Teubner Leipzig 1937 pp. 3-37 ser Corpus medicorum Graecorum, vol. 5.4.1.1 ed. de Boer.

THE DIAGNOSIS AND CURE OF THE SOUL’S PASSIONS
Chapters 1-10

You proposed a question about the treatise of Antonius, the Epicurean, On Guarding One’s Passions.[1] I answered your question, but since you are now asking to have my reply in the form of a commentary, I shall do so and herewith I begin.

ἀπεκρινάμην͵ ἣν ἐνετήω πρὸ ἡμᾶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ γραφέντο Ἀντωνίῳ τῷ Ἐπικουρείῳ βιβλίου περὶ τῆ τοῖ ἰδίοι πάθειν ἐφ εδρεία͵ ἤδη πράξω τοῦτο καὶ τήνδε τίθεμαι τὴν ἀρχήν.

Surely it would have been best for Antonius himself to have told us clearly what meaning he wishes to convey by the term “guarding”; as far as one could conjecture from what he says in the course of his book, I think he meâns either a watchfulness, or a diagnosis, or, in addition, a correction. But, as you know, he was manifestly indiscriminate and vague in his expression. Hence we must not expect to understand many of the things he said; at best we must expect to guess at his meaning. At one time he will seem to be urging us to consider how we ourselves are falling into many errors just as others do, and at another rime, how a man may recognize each of his errors, and again, in addition to these considerations, how a man may withdraw himself from his errors. This last seems to me to be the object of his whole discourse, since neither of the preceding considerations has any point unless referred to this end.

ἄριτον μὲν ἦν αὐτὸν τὸν Ἀντώνιον εἰρηκέναι αφῶ͵ τί ποτε βούλεται Ἐπειδὴ δέῃ καὶ δι΄ ὑπομνημάτων ἔχειν͵ ἃ πρὸ τὴν ἐρώτηιν ημαίνειν ἐκ τοῦ τῆ ἐφεδρεία ὀνόματο͵ ὡ δ΄ ἄν τι ἐξ ὧν 5.2 λέγει κατὰ τὸ  βιβλίον εἰκάειεν͵ ἤτοι τὴν παραφυλακὴν ἢ τὴν διάγνω ιν δοκεῖ μοι δηλοῦν ἢ καὶ πρὸ τούτοι τὴν ἐπανόρθωιν. ἐφαίνετο δ΄͵ ὡ οἶθα͵ υγκεχυμένω καὶ ἀαφῶ ἑρμηνεύων͵ ὥτε τὰ πολλὰ τῶν εἰρημένων εἰκάαι μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ νοῆαι αφῶ. ἐνίοτε μὲν γὰρ δόξει προτρέπειν ἡμᾶ ἐννοεῖν͵ ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλὰ παραπληίω τοῖ ἄλλοι ἁμαρτάνομεν͵ ἐνίοτε δ΄ ὅπω ἄν τι ἕκατον ὧν ἁμαρτάνει διαγι νώκοι͵ καὶ πρὸ τούτοι αὖθι͵ ὅπω ἄν τι ἑαυτὸν ἀπάγοι τῶν ἁμαρτανομένων͵ ὃ δοκεῖ μοι τοῦ λόγου παντὸ εἶναι κοπό· ἕκατον γὰρ τῶν προειρημένων ἄχρητόν ἐτι καὶ περιττόν͵ εἰ μὴ πρὸ τοῦτο ἀναφέροιτο.

But he should have (revised what he wrote), especially when distinguishing between passions and errors. For sometimes his discourse seems to concern the passions alone, often it seems to concern errors, and there are times when you will think he is discussing both. But as you know, I started by making this very distinction when I said that error arises from a false opinion, but passion from an irrational power within us which refuses to obey reason; commonly both are called errors in a more generic sense.[2] Therefore we say that the licentious man, and the man who acts in anger, and the man who believes slander are all in error.

διορθοῦν δ΄ ἐχρῆν αὐτὸν τὰ γραφέντα διορίζοντα ἐν τοῖ μά λιτα τὰ πάθη τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων. ἐνίοτε μὲν γὰρ ὡ περὶ μόνων τῶν παθῶν αὐτοῦ ὁ λόγο γίνεται͵ πολλάκι δ΄ ὡ περὶ τῶν ἁμαρ τημάτων͵ ἔτι δ΄ ὅτε περὶ ἀμφοτέρων διαλέγεθαί οι δόξει. ἐγὼ δ΄ αὐτὸ τοῦτο πρῶτον͵ ὡ οἶθα͵ διώρια͵ τὸ μὲν ἁμάρτημα κατὰ ψευδῆ 5.3 δόξαν εἰπὼν γίγνεθαι͵ τὸ δὲ πάθο κατά τιν΄ ἄλογον  ἐν ἡμῖν δύνα μιν ἀπειθοῦαν τῷ λόγῳ· κοινῇ δ΄ ἀμφότερα κατὰ τὸ γενικώτερον η μαινόμενον ἁμαρτήματα κεκλῆθαι. λέγομεν οὖν ἁμαρτάνειν καὶ τὸν ἀκο λαταίνοντα καὶ τὸν θυμῷ τι πράττοντα καὶ τὸν διαβολῇ πιτεύοντα.

Chrysippus and many other philosophers have written books on curing the passions of the soul; Aristotle and his followers also discussed (this question), as did Plato[3] before them. It would have been better for you to learn these matters from those men, even as I did. But since you bid me so, in this first discourse I shall discuss briefly all the main points and in the order in which you heard them when you inquired about the book written by Antonius.

γέγραπται μὲν οὖν καὶ Χρυίππῳ καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοῖ τῶν φιλοόφων θεραπευτικὰ γράμματα τῶν τῆ ψυχῆ παθῶν͵ εἴρηται δὲ καὶ πρὸ Ἀριτοτέλου περὶ τούτων καὶ τῶν ἑταίρων αὐτοῦ καὶ πρὸ τούτων ὑπὸ Πλάτωνο· καὶ ἦν μὲν βέλτιον ἐξ ἐκείνων μανθάνειν αὐτά͵ ὥπερ κἀγώ. τὰ δ΄ οὖν κεφάλαια διὰ τοῦ πρώ του λόγου τοῦδε διὰ υντόμου͵ ἐπειδὴ κελεύει͵ διήξω οι πάντα͵ καθ΄ ἣν ἤδη τάξιν ἤκουα͵ ὅτ΄ ἐπύθου περὶ τοῦ γεγραμμένου τῷ Ἀντωνίῳ βιβλίου.

II

 

It is likely that we do err even if we ourselves should think that we do not, and we can infer this from what follows. We see that all men suppose that they themselves are altogether without fault or that their errors are few and mild and at great intervals. This happens especially in the case of those who, in the eyes of other men, err the most. I certainly have strong proof for this if I have proof for anything. I have seen that those men who leave to others the task of declaring what kind of men they are fall into few errors, but I have seen that those men who suppose that they are excellent and who do not entrust this decision to others are the ones who fall most frequently into the gravest errors. When I was a young man, I thought that the Pythian dictum to “know thyself” was held in praise without good reason because it did not enjoin some great action. In later life, I discovered that this dictum was justly lauded because only the wisest man could know himself with accuracy. No other man could do this, although one man might have better or worse knowledge of himself than another man.

  Ὅτι μὲν εἰκό ἐτιν ἁμαρτάνειν͵ εἰ καὶ μὴ δοκοίημεν αὐτοὶ φάλλεθαί τι͵ πάρετιν ἐκ τῶνδε λογίαθαι· πάντα ἀνθρώπου ὁρῶμεν ἑαυτοὺ ὑπολαμβάνοντα ἤτοι γε ἀναμαρτήτου εἶναι παντά 5.4 παιν ἢ ὀλίγα καὶ μικρὰ καὶ διὰ πολλοῦ φάλλεθαι͵ καὶ τοῦτο  μά λιτα πεπονθότα͵ οὓ ἄλλοι πλεῖτα νομίζουιν ἁμαρτάνειν. ἐγὼ γοῦν͵ εἰ καί τινο ἑτέρου͵ καὶ τοῦδε παμπόλλην ἔχηκα πεῖραν· ὅοι μὲν τῶν ἀνθρώπων [ἐπ΄] ἄλλοι ἐπέθεντο τὴν περὶ αὑτῶν ἀπόφαν ιν͵ ὁποῖοί τινέ εἰιν͵ ὀλίγα τούτου ἐθεαάμην ἁμαρτάνοντα͵ ὅοι δ΄ ἑαυτοὺ ὑπειλήφαιν ἀρίτου εἶναι χωρὶ τοῦ τὴν κρίιν ἑτέροι ἐπιτρέψαι͵ μέγιτα καὶ πλεῖτα τούτου ἑώρακα φαλλομένου. ὥθ΄ ὅπερ ᾤμην͵ ὅτε μειράκιον ἦν͵ ἐπαινεῖθαι μάτην (τοῦτο δ΄ ἦν τὸ Πύθιον γνῶναι κελεῦον ἑαυτόν· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι μέγα τὸ πρόταγμα)͵ τοῦθ΄ εὗρον ὕτερον δικαίω ἐπαινούμενον. ἀκριβῶ μὲν γὰρ ὁ οφώ τατο μόνο ἂν ἑαυτὸν γνοίη͵ τῶν δ΄ ἄλλων ἁπάντων ἀκριβῶ μὲν οὐδεί͵ ἧττον δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἕτερο ἑτέρου.

In the whole of life and in the individual arts, it is usual for any man to recognize outstanding superiority and differences in things, but only those who are prudent men and skilled craftsmen can recognize slight superiority and differences. The same holds good in the matter of errors and passions. Whenever a man becomes violently angry over little things and bites and kicks his servants, you are sure that this man is in a state of passion. The same is true in the case of those who spend their time in drinking to excess, with prostitutes, and in carousing. But when the soul is moderately upset over a great financial loss or a disgrace, it is no longer equally obvious whether this condition belongs to the genus of passions, just as it is not quite certain that the man who eats cakes rather greedily is acting from passion. But even these things become clear to the man who has trained his soul beforehand and has discovered which of his passions need correction, even if (failure) to avoid them is no great defect because they are small.

καθάπερ γὰρ ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ βίῳ καὶ κατὰ πάα τὰ τέχνα τὰ μὲν μεγάλα ὑπεροχά τε καὶ διαφορὰ τῶν πραγμάτων ἅπαντο ἀνδρό ἐτι γνῶναι͵ τὰ δὲ μικρὰ τῶν φρονίμων τε καὶ τεχνιτῶν͵ οὕτω κἀπὶ τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων ἔχει 5.5 καὶ παθῶν. ὅτι μὲν ἐπὶ μικροῖ ὀργιζόμενο  φοδρῶ δάκνει τε καὶ λακτίζει τοὺ οἰκέτα͵ οὗτο μέν οι δῆλό ἐτιν ἐν πάθει καθετη κώ͵ ὁμοίω δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἐν μέθαι ἑταίραι τε καὶ κώμοι καταγίνε ται. τὸ δ΄ ἐπὶ μεγάλῃ βλάβῃ χρημάτων ἢ ἀτιμίᾳ μετρίω ταραχθῆναι τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκέθ΄ ὁμοίω ἐτὶ φανερόν͵ εἰ τοῦ γένου τῶν πα θῶν ὑπάρχει͵ ὥπερ οὐδὲ τὸ πλακοῦντα φαγεῖν ἀκυρώτερον͵ ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῦτα κατάδηλα γίνεται τῷ προμελετήαντι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐξοδιά αντί τε ἁπάντων παθῶν ἐπανορθώεω δεόμενα· εἰ καὶ μεῖ[ζ]όν γ΄ ἐλλιπὲ τὸ μὴ ἀποφυγεῖν αὐτά͵ διότι μικρά.

Therefore, whoever wishes to be good and noble must consider that he cannot but fail to recognize many of his own errors. I can tell him how he might discover them all, just as I have discovered them. But since this book can come into the hands of others, I remain silent and I am not yet telling my method; I want those men to exert themselves, too, so that they may discover a way to know their own errors before I tell them. Just as, therefore, I asked you to speak to me and remained silent until you said what seemed best to you, I shall pursue the same course now, after I have exhorted you who are engaged in reading this treatise to look for the very point therein set forth, namely, how a man may be able to recognize that he is in error.

ὅτι οὖν βούλεται καλὸ κἀγαθὸ γενέθαι͵ τοῦτο ἐννοηάτω͵ ὡ ἀναγκαῖόν ἐτιν αὐτὸν ἀγνοεῖν πολλὰ τῶν ἰδίων ἁμαρτημάτων· ὅπω δ΄ ἂν ἐξεύροι πάντα͵ δυνάμενο ἐγὼ λέγειν͵ [ὅπ]ὡ εὑρὼν αὐτό͵ οὔπω λέγω͵ διότι τὸ βιβλίον τοῦτο δύναταί ποτε καὶ εἰ ἄλλων ἀφικέθαι χεῖρα͵ ὅπω ἂν κἀκεῖνοι γυμναθῶι πρότερον ὁδὸν εὑρεῖν τῆ γνώεω τῶν ἰδίων ἁμαρτημάτων. ὥπερ οὖν καὶ έ μοι λέγειν 5.6 ἠξίωα καί͵ μέχρι τὸ αυτῷ δοκοῦν ἀπεφήνω͵ διειώπηα͵ καὶ νῦν  οὕτω πράξω͵ παρακαλέα τὸν ὁμιλοῦντα τῷδε τῷ γράμματι καταθέμενον αὐτὸ ζητῆαι͵ ὅπω ἄν τι ἑαυτὸν δύναιτο [τὸ] γνωρίζειν ἁμαρτάνοντα.

As Aesop says, we have two sacks suspended from our necks; the one in front is filled with the faults of others; the one behind is filled with our own.[4] This is the reason why we see the faults of others but remain blind to those which concern ourselves. All men admit the truth of this and, furthermore, Plato gives the reason for it. (Laws, 731e) He says that the lover is blind in the case of the object of his love. If, therefore, each of us loves himself most of all, he must be blind in his own case. How, then, will he see his own evils? And how will he know when he is in error? Both Aesop’s fable and Plato’s maxim seem to demonstrate to us that the discovery of one’s own errors is far beyond our hopes. For unless a man can separate himself from self-love, the lover must be blind in the case of the thing he loves.

δύο γάρ͵ ὡ Αἴωπο ἔλεγε͵ πήρα ἐξήμμεθα τοῦ τραχήλου͵ τῶν μὲν ἀλλοτρίων τὴν πρόω͵ τῶν ἰδίων δὲ τὴν ὀπίω͵ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὰ μὲν ἀλλότρια βλέπομεν ἀεί͵ τῶν δ΄ οἰκείων ἀθέατοι καθε τήκαμεν. καὶ τοῦτόν γε τὸν λόγον ὡ ἀληθῆ προίενται πάντε. ὁ δὲ Πλάτων καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀποδίδωι τοῦ γιγνομένου· τυφλώττειν γάρ φηι τὸ φιλοῦν περὶ τὸ φιλούμενον. εἴπερ οὖν ἕκατο ἡμῶν ἑαυτὸν ἁπάντων μάλιτα φιλεῖ͵ τυφλώττειν ἀναγκαῖόν ἐτιν αὐτὸν ἐφ΄ ἑαυτοῦ. πῶ οὖν ὄψεται τὰ ἴδια κακά; καὶ πῶ ἁμαρτάνων γνώεται; πολλῷ γὰρ ἔοικεν ὅ τε τοῦ Αἰώπου μῦθο καὶ ὁ τοῦ Πλάτωνο λόγο ἀνελπιτοτέραν ἡμῖν τὴν τῶν ἰδίων ἁμαρτημάτων εὕρειν ἀπο φαίνειν· εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦ φιλεῖν τι ἑαυτὸν ἀποτῆαι δύναται͵ τυφλώτ τειν ἀναγκαῖόν ἐτι τὸ φιλοῦν περὶ τὸ φιλούμενον.

Even if a man should make, by himself, as extensive an examination into his own errors as he could, he would find it difficult to discover them. Hence, I would not expect him who reads this book to consider, by himself, how to discover his own errors. Moreover, I am declaring my opinion with two purposes in mind: if someone by his own efforts should find some other way, by taking my method in addition to his own, he will be helped all the more because he has found not one but two ways to save himself; if he does not have a way of his own, he will be helped by the continuous use of mine until he finds another and a better way. With this preface, it is time for me to state what my way is.

οὐ μὴν οὐδ΄ ἐγὼ τὸν ἀναγινώκοντα τόδε τὸ βιβλίον ἠξίουν ἂν 5.7 ἐπικέψαθαι καθ΄ αὑτὸν  περὶ τῆ τῶν ἰδίων ἁμαρτημάτων εὑρέ εω͵ εἰ μὴ χαλεπὸν ἦν τὸ πρᾶγμα͵ κἄν τι ὡ ἐπὶ πλεῖτον ἐκεμ μένο ᾖ καθ΄ αὑτόν. καὶ τοίνυν ἐγὼ τὴν ἐμὴν ἀποφαίνομαι γνώμην͵ ἵν΄͵ εἰ μέν τινα καὶ αὐτὸ ἕκατο ἑτέραν ὁδὸν εὕροι͵ προλαβὼν καὶ τὴν ἐμὴν ὠφεληθῇ πλέον ἅτε διπλῆν ἀνθ΄ ἁπλῆ εὑρὼν ὁδὸν ωτη ρία· εἰ δὲ μή͵ ἀλλ΄ αὐτῇ γε τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ διατελῇ χρώμενο͵ ἄχρι περ ἂν ἑτέραν εὕρῃ βελτίονα· τί οὖν ἡ ἐμή͵ λέγειν ἂν ἤδη καιρό͵ ἀρχὴν τῷ λόγῳ τήνδε ποιηάμενον.

III

 

Since errors come from false opinion while the passions arise by an irrational impulse, I thought the first step was for a man to free himself from his passions; for these passions are probably the reason why we fall into false opinions. And there are passions of the soul which everybody knows: anger, wrath, fear, grief, envy, and violent lust. In my opinion, excessive vehemence in loving or hating anything is also a passion; I think the saying “moderation is best” is correct, since no immoderate action is good.

Ἐπειδὴ τὰ μὲν ἁμαρτήματα διὰ [τὴν] ψευδῆ δόξαν γίγνονται͵ τὰ δὲ πάθη διά τιν΄ ἄλογον ὁρμήν͵ ἔδοξέ μοι πρότερον ἑαυτὸν ἐλευ θερῶαι τῶν παθῶν· εἰκὸ γάρ πω καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ψευδῶ ἡμᾶ δο ξάζειν. ἔτι δὲ πάθη ψυχῆ͵ ἅπερ ἅπαντε γινώκουι͵ θυμὸ καὶ ὀργὴ καὶ φόβο καὶ λύπη καὶ φθόνο καὶ ἐπιθυμία φοδρά. κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἐμὴν γνώμην καὶ τὸ φθάαι πάνυ φόδρα φιλεῖν ἢ μιεῖν ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα πάθο ἐτίν. ὀρθῶ γὰρ ἔοικεν εἰρῆθαι τὸ μέτρον ἄριτον͵ 5.8 ὡ οὐδενὸ  ἀμέτρου καλῶ γιγνομένου.

How, then, could a man cut out these passions if he did not first know that he had them? But as we said, it is impossible to know them, since we love ourselves to excess. Even if this saying will not permit you to judge yourself, it does allow that you can judge others whom you neither love nor hate. Whenever you hear anyone in town being praised by many because he flatters no man, associate with that man and judge from your own experience whether he is the sort of man they say he is. First, if you see him going continually to the homes of the wealthy, the powerful, or even monarchs, be sure that you have heard falsely that this man always speaks the truth, for such adulation leads to lies. Second, be equally sure that his reputation is false if you see him greeting these people by name, visiting them, and even dining with them. Whoever has chosen such a life, not only does not speak the truth, but he is wholly evil, because he loves some or all of the following: wealth, rule, honors, reputation.

πῶ οὖν ἄν τι ἐκκόψειε ταῦτα μὴ γνοὺ πρότερον ἔχων αὐτά; γνῶναι δ΄͵ ὡ ἐλέγομεν͵ ἀδύνατον͵ ἐπειδὴ φόδρα φιλοῦμεν ἡμᾶ. ἀλλὰ κἂν μὴ αυτὸν ὁ λόγο οὗτο ἐπιτρέπῃ οι κρίνειν͵ ἄλλον γε υγχωρεῖ δύναθαι κρῖναι τὸν μήτε φιλούμενον ὑπὸ οῦ μήτε μιού μενον. ὅταν οὖν ἀκούῃ τινὰ τῶν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν [ὃν μήτε φιλήειν οἶδε μήτε μιήειν] ἐπαινούμενον ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἐπὶ τῷ μηδένα κολα κεύειν͵ ἐκείνῳ προφοιτήα τῇ αυτοῦ πείρᾳ κρῖνον͵ εἰ τοιοῦτό ἐτιν͵ οἷο εἶναι λέγεται͵ καὶ πρῶτον͵ ἐὰν ἴδῃ αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὰ τῶν πλου ίων τε καὶ πολὺ δυναμένων ἢ καὶ τὰ τῶν μονάρχων οἰκία ἐπιόντα υν εχῶ͵ γίγνωκε μάτην ἀκηκοέναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον τοῦτον ἀληθεύειν ἅπαντα (ταῖ γὰρ τοιαύται κολακείαι ἕπεται καὶ τὸ ψεύδεθαι)͵ δεύτερον ἢ προ αγορεύοντα ἢ παραπέμποντα τοὺ τοιούτου ὁρῶν αὐτὸν ἢ καὶ υν δειπνοῦντα. τοιοῦτον γάρ τι ἑλόμενο βίον οὐ μόνον οὐκ ἀληθεύει͵ 5.9 ἀλλὰ καὶ κακίαν ὅλην ἐξ ἀνάγκη ἔχει͵  φιλοχρήματο ὢν ἢ φίλαρχο ἢ φιλότιμο ἢ φιλόδοξο͵ ἤ τινα τούτων ἢ πάντα.

When a man does not greet the powerful and wealthy by name, when he does not visit them, when he does not dine with them, when he lives a disciplined life, expect that man to speak the truth; try, too, to come to a deeper knowledge of what kind of man he is (and this comes about through long association) . If you find such a man, summon him and talk with him one day in private; ask him to reveal straightway whatever of the above-mentioned passions he may see in you. Tell him you will be most grateful for this service and that you will look on him as your deliverer more than if he had saved you from an illness of the body. Have him promise to reveal it whenever he sees you affected by any of the passions I mentioned.

τὸν δὲ μὴ προ αγορεύοντα μήτε παραπέμποντα μήτε υνδειπνοῦντα τοῖ πολὺ δυνα μένοι ἢ πλουτοῦι καὶ κεκολαμένῃ τῇ διαίτῃ χρώμενον ἐλπία ἀλη θεύειν εἰ βαθυτέραν ἀφικέθαι πειρῶ γνῶιν͵ ὁποῖό τί ἐτιν (ἐν υνουίαι δ΄ αὕτη πολυχρονιωτέραι γίγνεται)͵ κἂν εὕρῃ τοιοῦτον͵ ἰδίᾳ ποτὲ μόνῳ διαλέχθητι παρακαλέα͵ ὅ τι ἂν ἐν οὶ βλέπῃ τῶν εἰρημένων παθῶν͵ εὐθέω δηλοῦν͵ ὡ χάριν ἕξοντι τούτου μεγίτην ἡγηομένῳ τε ωτῆρα μᾶλλον ἢ εἰ νοοῦντα τὸ ῶμα διέωε. κἂν ὑπόχηται δηλώειν͵ ὅταν ἴδῃ τι τῶν εἰρημένων πάχοντά ε͵ κἄπειτα πλειόνων ἡμερῶν μεταξὺ γιγνομένων μηδὲν εἴπῃ υνδιατρίβων δηλονότι͵ μέμψαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον͵ αὖθί τε παρακάλεον ἔτι λιπαρέτερον ἢ ὡ πρόθεν͵ ὅ τι ἂν ὑπὸ οῦ βλέπῃ κατὰ πάθο πραττόμενον͵ εὐθέω μηνύειν.

If, after several days, although he has obviously been spending time with you, he tells you nothing, reproach him and again urge him, still more earnestly than before, to reveal immediately whatever he sees you doing as the result of passion. If he tells you that he has said nothing because he has seen you commit no passionate act during this time, do not immediately believe him, nor think that you have suddenly become free from fault, but consider that the truth is one or the other of the following. First, the friend whom you have summoned has either been negligent and has not paid attention to you, or he remains silent because he is afraid to reproach you, or because he does not wish to be hated, knowing as he does that it is usual, as I might say, with all men to hate those who speak the truth. Second, if he has not remained silent for these reasons, perhaps he is unwilling to help you and says nothing for this or some other reason which we cannot find it in ourselves to praise.

ἐὰν δ΄ εἴπῃ οι͵ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἑωρακέναι περὶ ὲ τοιοῦτον ἐν τῷ μεταξύ͵ διὰ τοῦτο μηδ΄ αὐτὸ εἰρηκέναι͵ μὴ πειθῇ 5.10 εὐθέω μηδ΄ οἰηθῇ ἀναμάρτητο  ἐξαίφνη γεγονέναι͵ ἀλλὰ δυοῖν θά τερον͵ ἢ διὰ ῥᾳθυμίαν οὐ προεχηκέναι οι τὸν παρακληθέντα φίλον ἢ ἐλέγχειν αἰδούμενον ιωπᾶν ἢ καὶ μιηθῆναι μὴ βουλόμενον διὰ τὸ γινώκειν ἅπαιν ὡ ἔπο εἰπεῖν ἀνθρώποι ἔθο εἶναι μιεῖν τοὺ τἀληθῆ λέγοντα͵ ἢ εἰ μὴ διὰ ταῦτα͵ ἴω μὴ βουλόμενον αὐτὸν ὠφελεῖν ε διὰ τοῦτο ιωπᾶν͵ ἢ καὶ δι΄ ἄλλην τινὰ [ἴω] αἰτίαν͵ ἣν οὐκ ἐπαινοῦμεν ἡμεῖ. ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι τὸ μηδὲν ἡμαρτῆθαί οι͵ πιτεύα ἐμοὶ τοῦτο νῦν ἐπαινέει μ΄ ὕτερον͵ θεώμενο ἅπαν τα ἀνθρώπου καθ΄ ἑκάτην ἡμέραν μυρία μὲν ἁμαρτάνοντα καὶ κατὰ πάθο πράττοντα͵ οὐ μὴν αὐτού γε παρακολουθοῦντα.

If you will now believe me that it is impossible for you to have committed no fault, you will praise (me) hereafter when you see that every day all men fall into countless errors and do countless things in passion because they do not understand themselves. Do not, therefore, consider that you are something else and not a human being. But you do judge that you are something other than a human being if you mislead yourself into believing that you have done nothing but good actions for a whole day, much less for a whole month.

ὥτε μηδὲ ὺ νόμιζε αυτὸν ἄλλο τι καὶ μὴ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι. νομίζει δ΄ ἄλλο τι μᾶλλον ἢ ἄνθρωπο ὑπάρχειν͵ ἐὰν ἀναπείῃ αυτὸν ἅπαντα καλῶ οι πεπρᾶχθαι μὴ ὅτι μηνὸ ἑνό͵ ἀλλὰ μιᾶ ἡμέρα. ἴω οὖν ἐρεῖ͵ ἢν ἀντιλογικὸ ᾖ͵ ἤτοι κατὰ προαίρειν ἢ ἐκ 5.11 μοχθηροῦ τινο ἔθου γεγονὼ τοιοῦτο ἢ καὶ φύει φιλόνεικο ὤν͵ ὅον ἐπὶ τῷ νῦν ὑπ΄ ἐμοῦ προκεχειριμένῳ λόγῳ͵ τοὺ οφοὺ ἄνδρα ἄλλο τι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι.

If your own choice or some evil disposition has made you disputatious, or if you are naturally disposed to quarrel, perhaps you will rebut the argument I proposed before by contending that wise men are something more than human beings. But compare your argument with mine, which was twofold: first, that only the wise man is entirely free from fault; second, in addition to the foregoing, if the wise man is free from fault, neither is he a human being in this respect. This is why you hear the philosophers of old saying that to be wise is to become like God. (cf. Plato, Theaetetus, 176b.) But, surely, you would never suddenly come to resemble God. When those who have spent their entire lives training themselves to be free from emotion do not believe that they have perfectly acquired this goal, you should be all the more convinced that you are not free from emotion since you have never devoted yourself to this training.

τούτῳ δή ου τῷ λόγῳ τὸν ἡμέτερον ἀντίθε διττὸν ὄντα͵ τὸν μὲν ἕτερον͵ ὅτι μόνο ὁ οφὸ ἀναμάρτητό ἐτι τὸ πάμπαν͵ ἕτερον δ΄ ἐπ΄ αὐτῷ τῷ προϊεμένω͵ εἴπερ ἀναμάρτητό ἐτιν ὁ οφό͵ οὐδ΄ ἄνθρωπον ὑπάρχειν αὐτὸν ὅον ἐπὶ τῷδε. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τῶν παλαιοτάτων φιλοόφων ἀκούῃ λε γόντων ὁμοίωιν εἶναι θεῷ τὴν οφίαν. ἀλλὰ ύ γε θεῷ παραπλήιο ἐξαίφνη οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιο. ὅπου γὰρ οἱ δι΄ ὅλου τοῦ βίου τὴν ἀπά θειαν ἀκήαντε οὐ πιτεύονται τελέω αὐτὴν ἐχηκέναι͵ πολὺ δήπου μᾶλλον ὁ μηδέποτ΄ ἀκήα ύ· μὴ τοίνυν πιτεύῃ τῷ λέγοντι μηδὲν ἑωρακέναι κατὰ πάθο ὑπὸ οῦ πραττόμενον͵

Therefore, you must not believe the man who tells you he has seen you do nothing in passion; consider that he says this because he is unwilling to help you, or because he chooses not to observe the wrong you do, or because he wishes to make sure that you do not come to hate him. Perhaps, too, he has seen that you could not endure it in the past when someone censured your errors and passions; hence, he naturally remains silent because he does not believe you are telling the truth when you say that you wish to know every wrong action you commit.

ἀλλ΄ ἤτοι μὴ βουλόμενον ὠφελεῖν ε νόμιζε λέγειν οὕτω͵ ἢ μὴ παραφυλάξαι προῃρημένον͵ ἃ πράττει κακῶ͵ ἢ φυλαττόμενον ὑπὸ οῦ μιηθῆναι· τάχα δὲ καὶ εἶδέ έ ποτε δυχεράναντα πρὸ τὸν ἐπιτιμήαντα τοῖ οῖ ἁμαρτήμαί τε 5.12 καὶ πάθει͵ ὥτ΄ εἰκότω ιωπᾷ͵ μὴ πιτεύων ἀληθεύειν  ε λέγοντα βούλεθαι ἕκατον εἰδέναι͵ ὧν ἁμαρτάνει.

But if you will remain silent from the first and utter no complaint against him who would correct you and free you from your deeds (of passion), you will find in a very short time thereafter many men who will give you true correction; this will be all the more likely to happen if you show gratitude to your corrector after you have, thanks to him, removed the harm from yourself. You will find a great advantage in considering whether he is right or wrong in censuring you. If you do this continuously because you have really chosen to become a good and noble man, you will be such.

ἐὰν δὲ τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ὑπὸ οῦ κατὰ πάθο πραττομένων ἀπαλλαγεὶ ιωπήῃ͵ εὑρήει πολλοὺ ὀλίγον ὕτερον ἀληθῶ ἐπανορθουμένου ε͵ καὶ πόλυ γε μᾶλλον͵ ἐὰν χάριν γνῷ τῷ μεμψαμένῳ χωριθείη ου τῆ βλάβη τούτου γ΄ ἕνεκεν. ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ διακέψαθαι͵ πότερον ἀληθῶ ἢ ψευδῶ ἐπετίμηέ οι͵ μεγάλη ὠφελεία αἰθήῃ͵ κἂν υνεχῶ πράττῃ αὐτὸ προῃρημένο ὄντω εἷ γενέθαι καλὸ κἀγαθό͵ ἔῃ τοιοῦτο.

 

In the very beginning, even if you find on examination that he has brought a charge against you which is insolent and untrue, do not try to persuade yourself that you have done no wrong; but let this be your first rule of conduct, namely, to be steadfast when treated with insolence. Sometime later, when you see that your passions have been put under restraint, you may undertake to defend yourself against your slanderer. But do not make it clear by the bitterness of your reproof and by the contentiousness of your words that you wish to confound him; rather, give evidence that you are acting to improve yourself. Hence, after he has spoken persuasively and contradicted you, you will win him over to a better understanding, or you will find, after a more extensive examination, that he was in the right.

ἐν μὲν δὴ τῷ πρώτῳ χρόνῳ μηδ΄ ἐὰν καὶ κεπτόμενο ἀκριβῶ εὕρῃ ἐπηρεατικῶ τε καὶ ψευδῶ [ὡ] ἐγκεκληκότα οί τινα͵ πειρῶ αυτὸν πείθειν͵ ὡ οὐδὲν ἥμαρτε͵ ἀλλά οι τοῦτο πρῶτον φιλοόφημα τὸ καρτερεῖν ἐπηρεαζόμενον. ὕτερον δέ ποτε κατεταλμένων ἱκανῶ τῶν αυτοῦ παθῶν αἰθόμενο ἐπιχειρήει ἀπολογεῖθαι τοῖ ἐπη ρεάζουι μηδέποτε πικρῶ μηδ΄ ἐλεγκτικῶ μηδέ τοι φιλόνεικω ἐμ φαίνων [μηδὲ] καταβάλλειν ἐθέλειν ἐκεῖνον͵ ἀλλ΄ ὠφελεία ἕνεκα τῆ ῆ͵ ἵνα τι καὶ πρὸ τὴν ἀντιλογίαν ἀντειπόντο αὐτοῦ πιθανὸν ἤτοι 5.13 πειθῇ ἐκεῖνον  ἄμεινον γιγνώκειν ἢ μετὰ πλείονο ἐξετάεω εὕρῃ αὑτὸν ἔξω τῶν ἐγκλημάτων ὄντα.

So at any rate Zeno, too, deemed that we should act carefully in all things—just as if we were going to answer for it to our teachers shortly thereafter. For, according to Zeno, most men are ready to censure their neighbors, even if no one urges them to speak.

οὕτω γοῦν καὶ Ζήνων ἠξίου πάντα πράττειν ἡμᾶ ἀφαλῶ͵ ὡ ἀπολογηαμένου ὄλιγον ὕτερον τοῖ παιδαγωγοῖ. ὠνόμαζε γὰρ οὕτω ἐκεῖνο ὁ ἀνὴρ τοὺ πολλοὺ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἑτοίμου ὄντα τοῖ πέλα ἐπιτιμᾶν͵ κἂν μηδεὶ αὐτοὺ παρακαλῇ.

However, the man who asks for counsel must neither be wealthy nor possess civil dignity: fear will keep anyone from telling the truth to one in civil office, just as fear of losing their profit will keep flatterers from telling the truth to the rich. Even if there be someone who seems to be telling the truth, these flatterers stand aloof from him. If, therefore, anyone who is either powerful or also rich wishes to become good and noble, he will first have to put aside his power and riches, especially in these times when he will not find a Diogenes who will tell the truth even to a rich man or a monarch.

χρὴ δὲ τὸν ἀκούοντα μήτε πλούιον εἶναι μήτε αἰδοῦ ἔχειν πολιτικῆ͵ ὡ͵ ἄν γε ταύτην ἔχῃ͵ διὰ φόβον οὐδεὶ αὐτῷ τἀληθῆ λέ ξει͵ καθάπερ οὐδὲ τοῖ πλουτοῦι διὰ κέρδο οἱ κόλακε· ἀλλὰ κἂν εἴ τι ἀληθεύων παραφανῇ͵ διανίταται πρὸ αὐτῶν. ἐὰν οὖν τι ἤτοι πολλὰ δυνάμενο ἢ καὶ πλούιο ἐθελήῃ γενέθαι καλὸ κἀγαθό͵ ἀποθέθαι πρότερον αὐτὸν δεήει ταῦτα͵ καὶ μάλιτα νῦν͵ ὅπου γ΄ οὐχ εὑρήει Διογένη δυνάμενον εἰπεῖν τούτῳ τἀληθῆ͵ κἂν πλουιώτατο ᾖ͵ κἂν μόναρχο. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οὖν ὑπὲρ ἑαυτῶν βουλεύονται·

The rich and powerful, then, will be their own counsellors. But you are not one of the city’s wealthy or powerful men. So let all tell you what fault they find with you; be not angry with anyone; consider all, as Zeno said, as your teachers. Nor should you pay the saine heed to all the things they say to you. Heed most the older men who have lived excellent lives. Who these men of excellent life are, I have pointed out above.13 As time goes on, you will understand without their help and realize how great were your former errors; then especially will it be clear that I am telling you the truth when I say that no one is free from passions and errors, not even if he be of the best natural disposition and reared with the best habits, but that everybody slips and does so all the more when he is young.

ὺ δ΄ ὁ μὴ πλούιο μηδὲ δυνατὸ ἐν πόλει πᾶι μὲν ἐπίτρεπε λέγειν͵ ἃ καταγινώκουί ου͵ πρὸ μηδένα δ΄ αὐτὸ ἀγανάκτει͵ καὶ οὕτω ἔχε πάντα͵ ὡ  5.14 Ζήνων ἔλεγε͵ παιδαγωγού. οὐ μὴν ὁμοίω ε πᾶι περὶ ὧν ἂν εἴπωιν ἀξιῶ προέχειν͵ ἀλλὰ τοῖ ἄριτα βεβιωκόι πρεβύται. ὁποῖοι δ΄ εἰὶν οἱ ἄριτα βιοῦντε͵ ὀλίγον ἔμπροθεν εἶπον. ἐν δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ προϊόντι καὶ χωρὶ ἐκείνων αὐτὸ παρακολουθήει καὶ γνώῃ͵ πηλίκα πρόθεν [ἦν͵ ἄν] ἥμαρτε͵ ἡνίκα μάλιτα ἐγώ οι φανοῦμαι λέγων τἀληθῆ͵ μηδένα φάκων ἔξω παθῶν ἢ ἁμαρτημάτων εἶναι͵ μηδ΄ ἂν εὐφυέτατο ᾖ͵ μηδ΄ ἂν ἐν ἔθει καλλίτοι τεθραμμένο͵ ἀλλὰ πάν τω τινὰ φάλλεθαι καὶ μᾶλλον͵ ὅταν ἔτι νέο ᾖ.

IV

 

For each of us needs almost a lifetime of training to become a perfect man. Indeed, a man must not give up trying to make himself better even if, at the age of fifty, he should see that his soul has suffered damage which is not incurable but which has been left uncorrected. Even if a man of this age should find his body in poor condition, he would not give it over entirely to its poor health, but he would make every effort to make himself more vigorous, even if he could not have the bodily strength of a Hercules. Therefore, let us continue striving to make our souls more perfect, even if we cannot have the soul of a wise man. If from our youth we take thought for our soul, let us have the highest hope that we will one day have even this, namely, the soul of a wise man. If the fact is that we have failed in this, let us see to it that, at least, our soul does not become thoroughly evil—as was the body of Thersites. Suppose, when we were coming into existence, we could talk with the one superintending our birth; suppose we were to ask him for the most healthy body and he were to refuse; would we not, at all events, ask him successively for the body which was second, third, or fourth healthiest? If we cannot have the healthy body of Hercules, the body of Achilles is satisfactory; if we cannot have the health of Achilles, then let us have that of Ajax or Diomede or Agamemnon or Patroclus;

Δεῖται γὰρ ἀκήεω ἕκατο ἡμῶν χεδὸν δι΄ ὅλου τοῦ βίου πρὸ τὸ γενέθαι τέλειο ἀνήρ. οὐ μὴν ἀφίταθαι χρὴ τοῦ βελτίω ποιεῖν ἑαυτόν͵ εἰ καὶ πεντηκοντούτη τι ὢν αἴθοιτο τὴν ψυχὴν λε λωβημένο οὐκ ἀνίατον οὐδ΄ ἀνεπανόρθωτον λώβην. οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰ τὸ ῶμα κακῶ διέκειτο πεντηκοντούτη ὤν͵ ἔκδοτον ἂν ἔδωκε τῇ κα 5.15 χεξίᾳ͵ πάντω δ΄ ἂν ἐπειράθη βέλτιον αὐτὸ κατακευάαι͵ καίτοι τὴν Ἡράκλειον εὐεξίαν οὐ δυνάμενο χεῖν. μὴ τοίνυν μηδ΄ ἡμεῖ ἀφι τώμεθα τοῦ βελτίω τὴν ψυχὴν ἐργάζεθαι͵ κἂν τὴν τοῦ οφοῦ μὴ δυνώμεθα χεῖν͵ ἀλλὰ μάλιτα μὲν ἐλπίζωμεν ἕξειν κἀκείνην͵ ἂν ἐκ μειρακίου προνοώμεθα τῆ ψυχῆ ἡμῶν͵ εἰ δὲ μή͵ ἀλλὰ τοῦ γε μὴ πάναιχρον αὐτὴν γενέθαι͵ καθάπερ ὁ Θερίτη τὸ ῶμα͵ φροντίζωμεν. εἴ γ΄ οὖν ἐφ΄ ἡμῖν ἦν γινομένοι ἐντυχεῖν τῷ προνοουμένῳ τῆ γενέ εω ἡμῶν δεομένοι τε τοῦ λαβεῖν ῶμα γενναιότατον͵ ὁ δ΄ [ἣ] ἠρνήατο͵ πάντω ἂν ἐφεξῆ ἐδεήθημεν αὐτοῦ δεύτερον γοῦν ἢ τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον αὐτὸ χεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου κατ΄ εὐεξίαν. ἀγαπητὸν γὰρ εἰ καὶ μὴ τὸ τοῦ Ἡρακλέου͵ ἀλλὰ τό γε τοῦ Ἀχιλλέω χεῖν͵ ἢ εἰ μηδὲ τούτου͵ τό γε τοῦ Αἴαντο ἢ Διομήδου ἢ Ἀγαμέμνονο ἢ Πατρόκλου͵ εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτων͵ ἄλλων γέ τινων ἀγατῶν ἡρώων.

if •we cannot have any of these, then, at least, let us have the healthy body of some other hero whom we admire. In the same way, then, even if a man cannot have the most perfect health of soul, I think he would accept being second or third or fourth from the top. Nor is this impossible for one who has made up his mind, if he has been in continuous training over a considerable period of time.

οὕτω οὖν͵ εἰ καὶ μὴ τὴν τελείαν εὐεξίαν τι οἷό τ΄ ἐτὶ τῆ ψυχῆ ἔχειν͵ 5.16 δέξαιτ΄ ἂν οἶμαι δεύτερο ἢ τρίτο ἢ τέταρτο  γενέθαι μετὰ τὸν ἄκρον. οὐκ ἀδύνατον δὲ τοῦτο τῷ βουληθέντι κατεργάαθαι χρόνῳ πλείονι υνεχῶ τῆ ἀκήεω γενομένη.

When I was still a youth and pursuing this training, I watched a man eagerly trying to open a door. When things did not work out as he would have them, I saw him bite the key, kick the door, blaspheme, glare wildly like a madman, and all but foam at the mouth like a wild boar. When I saw this, I conceived such a hatred for anger that I was never thereafter seen behaving in an unseemly manner because of it. At present this will be enough to keep you from blaspheming, from kicking and biting stone and wood,15 from looking wild looks; this will be sufficient motive for you to conceal your anger and to keep it within you. A man cannot free himself from the habit of anger as soon as he resolves to do so, but he can keep in check the unseemly manifestations of his passion. If he will do this frequently, he will then discover that he is less prone to anger than he formerly was. Things which are unimportant or less important will not rouse his wrath; and even if he does become angry over matters which are of great importance his anger will be slight. And he will achieve this result, namely, that at some later date he will become only a little angry over serious matters, if he will follow a practice of mine. When I was a young man I imposed upon myself an injunction which I have observed through my whole life, namely, never to strike any slave of my household with my hand.

ἐγὼ δὲ μειράκιον ὢν ἔτι ταῦτ΄ ἀκήα͵ ἐπιδὼν ἄνθρωπον ἀνοῖξαι θύραν πεύδοντα͵ μὴ προχωρούη εἰ τὸ δέον αὐτῷ τῆ πράξεω δάκνοντα τὴν κλεῖν καὶ λακτίζοντα τὴν θύραν καὶ λοιδορούμενον τοῖ θεοῖ ἠγριωμένον τε τοὺ ὀφθαλμοὺ ὥπερ οἱ μαινόμενοι καὶ μικροῦ δεῖν αὐτὸν ἀφρὸν ὡ οἱ κάπροι προϊέμενον ἐκ τοῦ τόματο ἐμίηα τὸν θυμὸν οὕτω͵ ὥτε μηκέτ΄ ὀφθῆναι δι΄ αὐτὸν ἀχημονοῦντά με. ἀρκέει δὲ καὶ τοῦτο τήν γε πρώτην͵ ὡ μήτε θεοῖ λοιδορεῖθαί ε μήτε λακτίζειν μήτε δάκνειν τοὺ λίθου καὶ τὰ ξύλα͵ [καὶ] μήτ΄ ἄγριον ἐμβλέπειν͵ ἀλλ΄ ἐν αυτῷ κατέχειν τε καὶ κρύπτειν τὴν ὀργήν. ἀόργητο μὲν γὰρ εὐθέω ἅμα τῷ βουληθῆναι γενέθαι τι οὐ δύ ναται͵ καταχεῖν δὲ τὸ τοῦ πάθου ἄχημον δύναται. τοῦτο δ΄ ἂν πολλάκι ποιήῃ͵ γνωριεῖ ποτε καὶ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸν ἧττον νῦν ἢ πρό 5.17 θεν ὀργιζόμενον͵ ὡ μήτ΄ ἐπὶ μικροῖ μήτ΄ ἐπὶ  μέοι θυμοῦθαι ἀλλ΄ ἐπὶ μόνοι τοῖ μεγάλοι μικρόν. οὕτω γὰρ ὑπάρξει ποθ΄ ὕτε ρον αὐτὸν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖ μεγίτοι ὀργίζεθαι μικρόν͵ ἤν τι ὅπερ ἐγὼ προτάξα αὑτῷ μειράκιον ὢν ἔτι διὰ παντὸ ἐφύλαξα τοῦ βίου͵ φυλάξῃ τὸ μηδέποτε τυπτῆαι τῇ χειρί μου μηδένα τῶν οἰκετῶν͵

My father practiced this same restraint. Many were the friends he reproved when they had bruised a tendon while striking their slaves in the teeth; he told them that they deserved to have a stroke and die in the fit of passion which had come upon them. They could have waited a little while, he said, and used a rod or whip to inflict as many blows as they wished and to accomplish the act with reflection.

ὅπερ ἤκητό μου καὶ τῷ πατρί· καὶ πολλοῖ ἐπετίμηε τῶν φίλων περιθλάαι νεῦρον ἐν τῷ πατάξαι κατὰ τῶν ὀδόντων οἰκέτα͵ ἀξίου εἶναι λέγων ἐπὶ τῇ γενομένῃ φλεγμονῇ καὶ παθῆναι καὶ ἀποθανεῖν͵ ὅπου γ΄ ἐξῆν αὐτοῖ καὶ νάρθηκι καὶ ἱμάντι μικρὸν ὕτερον ἐμφορῆαι πληγά͵ ὅαι ἠβούλοντο τῇ βουλῇ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἔργον ἐπιτελεῖν.

Other men, however, not only (strike) with their fists but kick and gouge out the eyes and stab with a stylus when they happen to have one in their hands. I saw a man, in his anger, strike a slave in the eye with a reed pen. The Emperor Hadrian, they say, struck one of his slaves in the eye with a stylus; and when he learned that the man had lost his eye because of this wound, he summoned the slave and allowed him to ask for a gift which would be equal to his pain and loss. When the slave who had suffered the loss remained silent, Hadrian again asked him to speak up and ask for whatever he might wish. But he asked for nothing else but another eye. For what gift could match in value the eye which had been destroyed?

ἄλλοι δ΄ οὐ μόνον πὺξ παίουιν͵ ἀλλὰ καὶ λακτίζουι καὶ τοὺ ὀφθαλμοὺ ἐξορύττουι καὶ γραφείῳ κεντοῦιν͵ ὅταν τοῦτο τύχωιν ἔχοντε. εἶδον δέ τινα καὶ καλάμῳ δι΄ οὗ γράφομεν ὑπ΄ ὀργῆ εἰ τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν πατάξαντα τὸν οἰκέτην. Ἀδριανὸ δ΄ αὐτοκράτωρ͵ ὥ φαι͵ γραφείῳ πατάξα εἰ τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἕνα τῶν ὑπηρετῶν͵ ἐπειδὴ διὰ τὴν πληγὴν ταύτην ἔγνω γενόμενον ἑτερόφθαλμον͵ ἐκάλεέ τε καὶ 5.18 υνεχώρηεν ἀντὶ τοῦ πάθου αἰτεῖν  παρ΄ αὐτοῦ δῶρον. ἐπεὶ δὲ διειώπηεν ὁ πεπονθώ͵ αὖθι ἠξίωεν ὁ Ἀδριανὸ αἰτεῖν͵ ὅτι βού λοιτο͵ θαρροῦντα· τὸν δ΄ ἄλλων μὲν οὐδέν͵ ὀφθαλμὸν δ΄ αἰτῆαι. τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ γένοιτο δῶρον ἀντάξιον ἀπωλεία ὀφθαλμοῦ;

I wish to remind you of something which once happened to me, even if I have often spoken about this same incident. When I was returning home from Rome, I traveled together with a friend of mine from Gortyna in Crete. This friend was, in other respects, an estimable person because he was simple, friendly, good, and anything but miserly. But he was so prone to anger that he used to assail his servants with his hands and even sometimes his feet, but far more frequently with a whip or any piece of wood that happened to be handy.

βούλομαι δέ ε καὶ τῶν ἐμοί ποτε υμβάντων ἑνὸ ἀναμνῆαι καίτοι γ΄ ἤδη πολλάκι ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ εἰρηκώ· ἀπονοτήα γὰρ ἐκ Ρώμη υνωδοιπόρηά τινι φίλῳ τῶν ἐκ Γόρτυνο τῆ Κρήτη ἀνδρί͵ ὃ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα λόγου τινὸ ἄξιο (καὶ γὰρ ἁπλοῦ ἦν καὶ φιλικὸ καὶ χρητὸ ἐλευθέριό τε περὶ τὰ ἐφ΄ ἡμέρα δαπάνα)͵ ἦν δ΄ ὀργίλο οὕτω͵ ὡ ταῖ ἑαυτοῦ χερὶ χρῆθαι κατὰ τῶν οἰκετῶν͵ ἔτι δ΄ ὅτε καὶ τοῖ κέλει͵ πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ἱμάντι καὶ ξύλῳ τῷ παρατυχόντι.

When we were in Corinth, we decided to send all our baggage and all the servants, except two, from Cenchreae to Athens by ship while he would hire a cart for our journey overland by way of Megara. Indeed, when we had passed through Eleusis and were coming to the Thriasian Plain, he asked the servants (who were following the cart) about a piece of luggage, but they could give him no answer. He fell into a rage. Since he had nothing else with which to strike the young men, he picked up a good-sized sword in its scabbard and came down on the heads of both of them with the sword—scabbard and all. Nor did he bring down the flat side (for in this way he would have done no great damage) but struck with the cutting edge of the sword. The blade cut right through the scabbard and inflicted two very serious wounds on the heads of both—for he struck each of them twice. When he saw the blood pouring forth in abundant streams, he left us and quickly went off to Athens on foot for fear that one of the servants might die while he was still present. We got the wounded men safely to Athens.

γενομένοι οὖν ἡμῖν ἐν Κορίνθῳ πάντα μὲν ἔδοξε τὰ κεύη καὶ τοὺ οἰκέτα ἀπὸ Κεγχρεῶν εἰ Ἀθήνα ἐκπέμψαι κατὰ πλοῦν ἐκτὸ δυεῖν͵ αὐτὸν δ΄ ὄχημα μιθωάμενον πεζῇ διὰ Μεγάρων πορεύεθαι. καὶ δὴ διελθόντων ἡμῶν Ἐλευῖνα καὶ κατὰ τὸ Θριάιον ὄντων ἤρετο τοὺ 5.19 ἑπομένου οἰκέτα  αὐτῷ περί τινο κεύου· οἱ δ΄ οὐκ εἶχον ἀπο κρίναθαι. θυμωθεὶ οὖν͵ ἐπεὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο εἶχε͵ δι΄ οὗ πατάξειε τοὺ νεανίκου͵ ἐν θήκῃ περιεχομένην μάχαιραν μεγάλην ἀνελόμενο͵ ἅμα τῇ θήκῃ καταφέρει τῆ κεφαλῆ ἀμφοτέρων͵ οὐ πλατεῖαν ἐπενεγκών (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν οὕτω εἴργατο δεινόν)͵ ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ τέμνον τοῦ ξίφου. ἥ τ΄ οὖν θήκη διετμήθη παραχρῆμα καὶ τραῦμα μέγιτον ἐπὶ τῆ κεφαλῆ διττὸν ἀμφοτέροι εἰργάατο· δὶ γὰρ ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν ἐπάταξεν. ὡ δὲ πλεῖτον καὶ ἄμετρον αἷμα χεόμενον ἐθεάατο͵ κατα λιπὼν ἡμᾶ εἰ Ἀθήνα ἀπῄει βαδίζων ὠκέω ἕνεκα τοῦ μὴ δια φθαρῆναί τινα τῶν οἰκετῶν ἔτι παρόντο αὐτοῦ. ἐκείνου μὲν οὖν ἡμεῖ ἐώαμεν εἰ τὰ Ἀθήνα.

But my Cretan friend heaped charges on his own head. He took me by the hand and led me to a house; he handed over his whip, stripped off his clothes, and bade me to flog him for what he had done while in the violent grip of his cursed anger—for that is what he called it. When I laughed (and this was a reasonable reaction), he fell on his knees and begged me to do what he asked. It was very clear that the more he kept importuning me and asking to be flogged, the more he was making me laugh. When we had wasted enough time in begging and laughing, I promised him that I would flog him if he would himself grant me the one very small thing which I was going to ask. When he did promise, I urged him to pay attention to me while I had a few words to say to him, since this was my request. When he had promised that he would do so, I spoke to him at some length and admonished him that it was necessary to train the irascible element within us. This is the way, obviously, that I flogged him and not in the way he asked. After I had instructed him, I went away.

ὁ δὲ φίλο ὁ Κρὴ ἑαυτοῦ καταγνοὺ μεγάλω εἰάγει με λαβόμενο τῆ χειρὸ εἰ οἶκόν τινα͵ καὶ προδοὺ ἱμάντα καὶ ἀποδυάμενο ἐκέλευε ματιγοῦν αὑτὸν ἐφ΄ οἷ ἔπραξεν ὑπὸ τοῦ καταράτου θυμοῦ βιαθεί· αὐτὸ γὰρ οὕτω ὠνόμαεν. ἐμοῦ δ΄ ὡ εἰκὸ γελῶντο ἐδεῖτο προπίπτων τοῖ γόναι͵ μὴ ἄλλω ποι 5.20 εῖν. εὔδηλον οὖν͵ ὅτι μᾶλλον ἐποίει με γελᾶν͵  ὅῳ μᾶλλον ἐνέκειτο ματιγωθῆναι δεόμενο. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταῦτα ποιούντων ἡμῶν ἱκανὸ ἐτρίβετο χρόνο͵ ὑπεχόμην αὐτῷ δώειν πληγά͵ εἴ μοι παράχοι καὶ αὐτὸ ἕν͵ ὃ ἂν αἰτήω͵ μικρὸν πάνυ. ὡ δ΄ ὑπέχετο͵ παρεκάλουν παραχεῖν μοι τὰ ὦτα λόγον τινὰ διερχομένῳ͵ καὶ τοῦτ΄ ἔφην εἶναι τὸ αἴτημα. τοῦ δ΄ ὑποχομένου πράξειν οὕτω͵ πλέον αὐτῷ διελέχθην ὑποτιθέμενο͵ ὅπω χρὴ παιδαγωγῆαι τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν θυμοειδέ͵ [τ]ᾧ λόγῳ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ διαματιγῶν ἀλλ΄ ἑτέρῳ τρόπῳ͵ παιδαγωγήα ἀπῆλθον.

That friend of mine, then, took thought for himself and in a year he became a much better man. Even if you should not become much better, be satisfied if in the first year you have advanced and shown some small measure of improvement. If you continue to withstand your passion and to soften your anger, you will show more remarkable improvement during the second year; then, if you still continue to take thought for yourself, you will notice a great increase in the dignity of your life in the third year, and after that, in the fourth year, the fifth, and so on. A man does everything, for many years in succession, that he may become a good physician, or public speaker, or grammarian, or geometer. Is it a disgrace for you to toil for a long time that you may one day be a good man?

ἐκεῖνο μὲν οὖν ἐν ἐνιαυτῷ προνοηάμενο ἑαυτοῦ πολὺ βελ τίων ἐγένετο. ὺ δ΄ εἰ καὶ μὴ πολὺ γένοιο βελτίων͵ ἀρκεθήῃ γε καὶ μικρῷ τινι κατὰ τὸν πρῶτον ἐνιαυτὸν ἐπιδοῦναι πρὸ τὸ κρεῖττον. ἐὰν γὰρ ἐπιμείνῃ τῷ πάθει τ΄ ἀντέχων καὶ πραΰνων τὸν θυμόν͵ ἀξιολογώτερον ἐπιδώει κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον ἔτο. εἶτ΄ ἐὰν ἔτι διαμείνῃ ἑαυτοῦ προνοούμενο καὶ μᾶλλον ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ καὶ μετ΄ αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ 5.21 τετάρτῳ  καὶ πέμπτῳ καὶ τοῖ ἑξῆ͵ αἰθήῃ μεγάλη αὐξήεω εἰ βίου εμνότητα. αἰχρὸν γάρ͵ ἵνα μέν τι ἰατρὸ ἀγαθὸ ἢ ῥήτωρ ἢ γραμματικὸ ἢ γεωμέτρη γένηται͵ πολλοῖ ἔτειν ἐφεξῆ πάντα κι νεῖν͵ ὲ δ΄ ἄνθρωπον ἀγαθόν ποτε γενέθαι τῷ μήκει τοῦ χρόνου κάμνειν.

V

 

How, then, does one begin this training? Let us take it up again, for there is no harm in saying the same things twice or three times in matters which are most necessary. The beginning is never to use one’s own hand in punishing a servant who has done wrong. I once heard that Plato had forgiven one of his servants who had done some wrong; because I thought his action noble, I acted in the same way throughout my life. So, too, you must exhort yourself never to strike a slave with your own hands, nor to assign the task to another while you are still angry; put it off until the next day. After your wrath has subsided, you will consider with greater prudence how many lashes should be given to the one who has merited the flogging.

Τί οὖν ἐτιν ἡ τῆ ἀκήεω ἀρχή; πάλιν ἀναλάβωμεν (ὑπὲρ γὰρ τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων οὐδὲν χεῖρόν ἐτι καὶ δὶ καὶ τρὶ λέγειν τὰ αὐτά) τὸ μηδέποτε μηδένα τῶν οἰκετῶν ἁμαρτάνοντα διὰ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ χειρῶν νουθετεῖν· ἀλλ΄ ὥπερ ἐγώ ποτε πυθόμενο αἰδεῖθαι Πλά τωνα πρό τινα τῶν ὑπηρετῶν ἁμαρτόντα διὰ παντὸ οὕτω ἔπραξα͵ καλὸν ἡγηάμενο εἶναι τὸ ἔργον͵ οὕτω καὶ ὺ παράγγειλον ἑαυτῷ μήτ΄ αὐτὸ διὰ τῶν αὑτοῦ χειρῶν οἰκέτην πλῆξαι μήτ΄ ἄλλῳ προτά ξαι͵ παρ΄ ὃν ἂν ὀργιθῇ χρόνον͵ ἀλλ΄ εἰ τὴν ὑτεραίαν ἀναβαλέθαι. κατατάντο γάρ τοι τοῦ θυμοῦ ωφρονέτερον ἐπικέψῃ͵ πόα χρὴ πληγὰ ἐντεῖναι τῷ τῆ κολάεω ἀξίῳ.

Is it not better to be reasonable at first and to postpone inflicting the punishment, even if you have called for the whip, lashed him with your tongue, and threatened never again to forgive him if he be guilty thereafter of similar misdeeds? Surely, it is much better to inflict the punishment when you are no longer boiling with passion and after you are free from your unreasoning rage; fresh reflection will then show you what has to be done. You can see that rage is a madness from the things men do when they are in the grip of rage: they strike and kick and rip their clothes; they shout and glare; they go on and on until, as I said, they become enraged at doors and stones and keys, smashing one thing, biting another, kicking a third.

ἢ μηδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἄμεινόν 5.22 ἐτι  ὺν γνώμῃ πρᾶξαι οὕτω αἰτήαντα ἱμάντα καὶ ωφρονίαντα λόγῳ καὶ ἀπειλήαντα μηκέτι τοῦ λοιποῦ υγχωρήειν͵ ἐὰν ὁμοίω ἁμάρτῃ; πολλῷ γὰρ ἄμεινόν ἐτι μηκέτι ζέοντο τοῦ θυμοῦ πράττειν͵ ἃ πράττει͵ ἔξω τῆ ἀλογίτου μανία γενόμενον͵ ὁπότε καινῷ λογι μῷ τὸ ποιητέον εὑρήει. ὅτι γὰρ ὁ θυμὸ οὐδὲν ἀποδεῖ μανία͵ ἐξ αὐτῶν ὧν ποιοῦιν οἱ θυμούμενοι μαθεῖν ἔτι. παίοντε γὰρ καὶ λακτίζοντε καὶ καταχίζοντε ἱμάτια καὶ θορυβῶδε ἐμβλέποντε ἕκατα πράττουιν͵ ἄχρι τοῦ͵ καθάπερ ἔφην͵ καὶ θύραι καὶ λίθοι καὶ κλειὶν ὀργίζεθαι καὶ τὰ μὲν καταράειν͵ τὰ δὲ δάκνειν͵ τὰ δὲ λακτίζειν.

Perhaps you say that these actions are characteristic of men who are truly mad, whereas the things you do are characteristic of the temperate man. I admit that those who strike their servants with their own hands are not such great sinners as those who bite and kick stones, doors, and keys, but I am convinced that inflicting an incurable injury on a human being is the act either of someone slightly insane or of an irrational, wild animal. Man alone, as compared with other things, has the special gift of reason; if he casts this gift aside and indulges his anger, he is living and acting like a wild animal rather than a man.

ἀλλ΄ ἴω φήει ὺ ταῦτα τῶν ὄντω μαινομένων εἶναι͵ τὰ δ΄ ὑπὸ οῦ γιγνόμενα ωφρονούντων· ἐγὼ δ΄ ὅτι μὲν ἔλαττον ἁμαρτάνουι τῶν τοὺ λίθου καὶ τὰ θύρα καὶ τὰ κλεῖ δακνόντων τε καὶ λακτι ζόντων οἱ τοὺ οἰκέτα ταῖ ἑαυτῶν παίοντε χερὶν ὁμολογῶ͵ πέ πειμαι δὲ καὶ τὸ πρὸ ἄνθρωπον ἀνίατόν τι ποιεῖν ἢ μικρᾶ μανία 5.23 ἔργον ὑπάρχειν ἢ ζῴου τινὸ ἀλόγου τε καὶ ἀγρίου· ὅπου γὰρ  μόνο ἄνθρωπο ἐξαίρετον ἔχει παρὰ τὰ ἄλλα τὸ λογίζεθαι͵ τοῦτ΄ ἐὰν ἀπορρίψα τῷ θυμῷ χαρίζηται͵ ζῴου͵ οὐκ ἀνθρώπου βίο.

Therefore, do not consider him a wise man who only stands acquitted of this very thing, namely, kicking, biting, and stabbing those nearby. Such a man, it is true, is no longer a wild beast, but he is indeed not yet a wise man; he is somewhere between the two. Are you, therefore, content if you no longer are a wild beast? Are you not concerned with becoming a good and noble man? Or, since you are no longer a wild beast, is it not better that you cease to be mad and irrational? If you will never be a slave to anger, if you will always reason things out and do everything you think best after dispassionate consideration, you will be a good and noble man.

μὴ τοίνυν νόμιζε φρόνιμον ἄνθρωπον ὑπάρχειν͵ ὃ ἂν αὐτὸ τοῦτο μόνον ἐκφύγῃ τὸ λακτίζειν καὶ δάκνειν καὶ κεντεῖν τοὺ πέλα ὁ γὰρ τοιοῦτο οὐκέτι μέν ἐτι θηρίον͵ οὐ μὴν ἤδη γε φρόνιμο ἄνθρωπο ἀλλ΄ ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ τούτων καὶ τῶν θηρίων. ἆρ΄ οὖν ἀρκεῖ οι μηκέτ΄ εἶναι θηρίῳ͵ τοῦ δ΄ ἄνθρωπο γενέθαι καλὸ κἀγαθὸ οὐ πεφρόν τικα; ἢ βέλτιον͵ ὥπερ οὐκέτι θηρίον͵ οὕτω μηδ΄ ἄφρονά ε μηδ΄ ἀλόγιτον ἔτι διαμένειν; ἔῃ δὲ τοιοῦτο͵ ἐὰν μηδέποτε θυμῷ δου λεύων͵ ἀλλ΄ ἀεὶ [δια]λογιζόμενο ἅπαντα πράττῃ ἅ [παντα] οι χωρὶ τοῦ πάθου κεπτομένῳ φαίνεται κράτιτα.

How will this come to pass? It will come to pass after you have conferred upon yourself the greatest conceivable honor. If you are the one man who is not prone to anger, does this not prove that you are better than all men? But perhaps you wish to be considered better, although you are not willing really to be better—like someone who, in reality, is physically sick but is eager to be thought healthy. Do you not think that anger is a sickness of the soul? Or do you think that men of old were wrong when they spoke of grief, wrath, anger, lust, fear, and all the passions as diseases of the soul?[5]

πῶ οὖν ἔται τοῦτο; τιμήαντό ου τιμῆ εαυτὸν μεγίτη͵ ἧ οὐδ΄ ἐπινοῆαι δυνατόν ἐτι μείζονα. τὸ γὰρ ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων ὀργιζομένων αὐτὸν ἀόργητον εἶναι͵ τί ἄλλο ἐτὶν ἢ ἑαυτὸν ἐπιδεῖξαι πάντων ἀνθρώπων βελτίονα; 5.24 ὺ δ΄ ἴω [τί ἄλλο ἐτὶν ἑαυτὸν ἀποδεῖξαι] νομίζεθαι μὲν εἶναι βελτίων ἐθέλει͵ εἶναι δὲ ὄντω βελτίων οὐ βούλει͵ καθάπερ εἴ τι ἐπεθύμηε νομίζεθαι μὲν ὑγιαίνειν τὸ ῶμα͵ νοεῖν δὲ κατ΄ ἀλήθειαν. ἢ οὐχ ἡγεῖ νόημα ψυχῆ εἶναι τὸν θυμόν; ἢ μάτην ὑπὸ τῶν πα λαιῶν ὀνομάζεθαι νομίζει πάθη ψυχῆ πάντα ταῦτα͵ λύπην ὀργὴν θυμὸν ἐπιθυμίαν φόβον;

As I see it, this is by far the better course to follow: first, if a man wishes to keep as free as he can from the passions I mentioned, as soon as he gets up from bed, let him consider for each of his daily tasks whether it is better to live as a slave to his passions or to apply reason to each of them; second, if he wishes to become good and noble, let him seek out someone who will help him by disclosing his every action which is wrong; next, (he must) keep this thought before his mind each day and hour: it is better for him to esteem himself as one of the good and noble, but none of us can succeed in this unless he has someone to point out his every error; moreover, we must consider the one who shows us our every fault as our deliverer and greatest friend.

ἀλλ΄ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ βέλτιον εἶναι [δοκεῖ] μακρῷ τὸν βουλόμενον ὡ ἐπὶ πολὺ ἔχειν ἄνευ τῶν εἰρημένων παθῶν πρῶτον μὲν ἐξανα τάντα τῆ κοίτη ἐπικοπεῖθαι πρὸ πάντων τῶν καθ΄ ἡμέραν ἔργων͵ ἆρα βέλτιόν ἐτι πάθει δουλεύοντα ζῆν ἢ λογιμῷ χρῆθαι πρὸ ἅπαντα· δεύτερον δ΄͵ ὅτι τῷ βουλομένῳ γίγνεθαι καλῷ κἀγαθῷ παρα κλητέον [δ΄] ἐτὶ τὸν δηλώοντα τῶν ὑφ΄ ἑαυτοῦ πραττομένων οὐκ ὀρθῶ ἕκατον· εἶθ΄ ὅτι χρὴ καθ΄ ἑκάτην ἡμέραν τε καὶ ὥραν ἔχειν ἐν προχείρῳ τὴν δόξαν ταύτην͵ ὡ ἄμεινον μέν ἐτιν ἑαυτὸν τιμῆαι τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν͵ τοῦτο δ΄ ἄνευ τοῦ χεῖν τὸν δηλώαντα τῶν ἁμαρτανομένων ἕκατον ἀδύνατόν ἐτιν ἡμῖν περιγενέθαι͵

Furthermore, even if you sometimes think that the charges such a friend lays at your door are false, you should restrain your anger. Why? First, it is possible that he sees better than you do the errors into which you fall, just as it is possible that you see it better than he when he does something wrong. Second, even if at times he is wrong in upbraiding you, you must on that account rouse yourself to a more accurate examination of your actions. But the most important thing is that, after you have decided to esteem yourself as a good and noble man, you see to it that you keep before your mind the ugliness of soul of those who are angry and the beauty of soul of those who are not prone to anger.

καὶ 5.25 μέντοι καὶ [τὸν] ωτῆρα ἐκεῖνον  καὶ φίλον μέγιτον ἡγεῖθαι τὸν μηνύαντα τῶν πλημμελουμένων ἕκατα· εἶθ΄ ὅτι͵ κἂν ψευδῶ οι φαίνηταί ποτ΄ ἐγκαλέα͵ ἀόργητον προήκει φαίνεθαι͵ πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι δύνατόν ἐτιν ἐκεῖνον οῦ βέλτιον ὁρᾶν ἕκατον ὧν ἁμαρτάνων τυγχάνει͵ ὥπερ καί ε τῶν ἐκείνου τι͵ δεύτερον ὅτι κἂν ἐπηρεάῃ ποτὲ ψευδῶ͵ ἀλλ΄ οὖν ἐπήγειρέ ε πρὸ ἀκριβετέραν ἐπίκεψιν͵ ὧν πράττει. ὃ δ΄ ἐτὶ μέγιτον ἐν τούτῳ͵ ἀεὶ φύλαττε͵ προῃρημένο γε τιμᾶν εαυτόν. ἔτι δὲ τοῦτο διὰ μνήμη ἔχειν πρόχειρα τό τε τῶν ὀργιζομένων τῆ ψυχῆ αἶχο τό τε τῶν ἀοργήτων κάλλο.

A man who has for a long time habitually fallen into error finds it difficult to remove the defilement of the passions from his soul; hence, he must for a long time practice each of the principles that are calculated to make the man who complies with them a good and noble person. For the soul is already full of passions, and, hence, we fail to notice one which is driven from the soul without great effort on our part. Therefore, each of us who wishes to be saved has to understand that (he must) not relax his vigilance for a single hour; we must permit all men to accuse us; we must listen to them in a gentle spirit; (we must show) gratitude, not to those who flatter us, but to those who rebuke us.

ὃ γὰρ ἁμαρτάνειν ἐθιθεὶ χρόνῳ πολλῷ δυέκνιπτον ἔχε τὴν κηλῖδα τῶν παθῶν͵ τούτῳ καὶ τῶν δογμάτων͵ οἷ πειθόμενο ἀνὴρ γενήῃ καλὸ κἀγαθό͵ ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ προήκει μελετᾶν ἕκατον. ἐπιλανθανόμεθα γὰρ αὐτοῦ ῥᾳδίω ἐκπίπτοντο τῆ ψυχῆ ἡμῶν διὰ τὸ φθάαι πεπλη ρῶθαι τοῖ πάθειν αὐτήν. τοιγαροῦν παρακολουθητέον ἐτὶν ἑκάτῳ τῶν ωθῆναι βουλομένων͵ ὡ δεῖ μηδεμίαν ὥραν ἀπορρᾳθυμεῖν͵ ἐπι 5.26 τρεπτέον τε πᾶι κατηγορεῖν ἡμῶν͵ παρακουτέον  τε πράω αὐτῶν καὶ χάριν ἰτέον οὐ τοῖ κολακεύουιν͵ ἀλλὰ τοῖ ἐπιπλήττουιν.

If you have prepared yourself so well that you are confident that no one who comes to visit you will find you caught in the strong grip of any of the major errors, let the door to your house always stand open and grant your close friends the right to enter at any time. Cutting out any error is difficult for one who is unwilling to try. But if a man determines to do so, it is very easy to get rid of the major errors. With your door ever standing open, as I said, give your close friends the authority to enter at any time. All men who have entered public life try to be moderate in all their actions; you must do the same in your own home. When those men [in public life] have done some wrong and are caught, they are not ashamed of themselves but that others have found them out. But you must be ashamed of yourself and pay special heed to him who says:

ἀνεῴχθω ου ἡ θύρα διὰ παντὸ τῆ οἰκήεω καὶ ἐξέτω τοῖ υνήθειν εἰιέναι πάντα καιρόν͵ ἢν οὕτω ᾖ παρεκευαμένο͵ ὡ θαρρεῖν ὑπὸ τῶν εἰιόντων εὑρίκεθαι μηδενὶ τῶν μεγάλων ἁμαρτη μάτων ἰχυρῶ κατειλημμένον. ἔτι δ΄ ὥπερ τῷ ἄκοντι πᾶν ἐκκόψαι δύκολον͵ οὕτω τὰ μεγάλα τῷ βουληθέντι ῥᾷτον. τῆ θύρα οὖν ἀνεῳγμένη ου διὰ παντό͵ ὡ εἶπον͵ ἐξουία τοῖ υνήθειν ἔτω κατὰ πάντα καιρὸν εἰιέναι. ὡ δ΄ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντε ἄνθρωποι προ ελθόντε εἰ τὸ δημόιον ἅπαντα πειρῶνται πράττειν κομίω͵ οὕτω ὺ κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν οἰκίαν πρᾶττε. ἀλλ΄ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν αἰδούμενοι τοὺ ἄλλου ἁμαρτόντε τι φωραθῆναι μόνου ἑαυτοὺ οὐκ αἰδοῦνται͵ ὺ δὲ αυτὸν αἰδοῦ μάλιτα πειθόμενο τῷ φάντι·

“Of all things, be most ashamed of yourself”.[6]

πάντων δὲ μάλιτ΄ αἰχύνεο αυτόν.

If you do this, some day you will be able to tame and calm that power of passion within you which is as irrational as some wild beast. Untamed horses are useless, but horsemen can in a short time make them submissive and manageable. Can you not take and tame this thing which is not some beast from outside yourself but an irrational power within your soul, a dwelling it shares at every moment with your power of reason? Even if you cannot tame it quickly, can you not do so over a longer period of time? It would be a terrible thing if you could not.

οὕτω γὰρ πράττων δυνήῃ ποτὲ τὴν τοῦ θυμοειδοῦ ἐν οὶ δύναμιν 5.27 ἄλογον ὥπερ τι θηρίον ἡμερῶαί τε καὶ πραῧναι· ἢ δεινὸν ἂν εἴη τοὺ μὲν ἱππικοὺ ἄνδρα ἀχρείου τοὺ ἵππου παραλαβόντα ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ χειροήθει ἐργάζεθαι͵ ὲ δ΄ οὐκ ἔξωθέν τι λαβόντα ζῷον͵ ἀλλ΄ ἐν τῇ αυτοῦ ψυχῇ δύναμιν ἄλογον͵ ᾗ διὰ παντὸ ὁ λογιμό ου υνοικεῖ͵ μὴ δυνηθῆναι πραῧναι ταύτην͵ εἰ καὶ μὴ ταχέω͵ ἀλλ΄ ἐν μακροτέρῳ χρόνῳ.

VI

 

My treatise On Moral Character [NB. lost]  told at length how a man might make his soul a very good one; it pointed out that there is no need for him to destroy his soul’s strength any more than we would destroy the strength of the horses and dogs which we put to our use. But just as we exercise our horses and dogs in the practice of obedience, we must also cultivate obedience in our soul. That same treatise also made it quite clear to you how you might use the irascible power itself to help you fight against the other power, which the philosophers of old called the concupiscible, (Plato, Republic, 440a) by which we are carried, without thinking, to the pleasures of the body.

Λέλεκται δ΄ ἐπὶ πλέον ἐν τοῖ Περὶ ἠθῶν ὑπομνήμαιν͵ ὅπω ἂν ἀρίτην τι αὐτὴν ἐργάαιτο καὶ ὡ τὴν μὲν ἰχὺν οὐ χρὴ καταβαλεῖν αὐτῆ͵ ὥπερ οὐδὲ τῶν ἵππων τε καὶ κυνῶν͵ οἷ χρώ μεθα͵ τὴν δ΄ εὐπείθειαν ὡ ἐκείνων οὕτω καὶ ταύτη ἀκεῖν. ἐπι δέδεικται δέ οι [καὶ] δι΄ ἐκείνων τῶν ὑπομνημάτων οὐχ ἥκιτα καὶ ὅπω αὐτῇ πάλιν τῇ τοῦ θυμοειδοῦ δυνάμει υμμάχῳ χρήῃ κατὰ τῆ ἑτέρα͵ ἣν ἐπιθυμητικὴν ἐκάλουν οἱ παλαιοὶ φιλόοφοι͵ φε ρομένη ἀλογίτω ἐπὶ τὰ διὰ τοῦ ώματο ἡδονά.

When a man’s anger makes his behavior unseemly, it is a disgraceful thing to see. It is just as disgraceful when his unseemly behavior is due to erotic desire and gluttony and to drunkenness and luxuriousness in eating, which are actions and passions belonging to the concupiscible power of his soul. Unlike the irascible power, I represented this power as not suited to horses and dogs but befitting the wild boar and goat and any of the wild beasts which cannot be domesticated. And so there is no training for the concupiscible power corresponding to the training afforded by obedience to the irascible part of the soul, but there is a kind of analogy between this obedience and what the ancients called chastisement.

ὥπερ οὖν αἰχρὸν θέαμα διὰ θυμὸν ἄνθρωπο ἀχημονῶν͵ οὕτω καὶ δι΄ ἔρωτα καὶ 5.28 γατριμαργίαν͵ οἰνοφλυγίαν τε καὶ λιχνείαν͵ ἃ τῆ ἐπιθυμητικῆ ἐτι δυνάμεω ἔργα τε καὶ πάθη͵ προεοικυία οὐχ ἵππῳ καὶ κυνί͵ καθάπερ εἴκαα τὴν πρώτην͵ ἀλλ΄ ὑβριτῇ κάπρῳ καὶ τράγῳ καί τινι τῶν ἀγρίων ἡμερωθῆναι μὴ δυναμένων. διὸ ταύτη μὲν οὐδεμία παίδευι τοιαύτη ἐτὶν οἵα τῆ ἑτέρα ἡ εὐπείθεια͵ ὃ δ΄ ἐκάλουν οἱ παλαιοὶ κολάζειν ἀναλογίαν τινὰ ἔχει πρὸ τήνδε.

The chastisement of the concupiscible power consists in not furnishing it with the enjoyment of the things it desires. If it does attain to this enjoyment, it becomes great and strong; if it is disciplined and corrected, it becomes small and weak. The result is that the concupiscible power does not follow reason because it is obedient but because it is weak. Surely the same is true with human beings themselves: we see that the worse follow the better either because the inferior men are forced against their wills, as is the case with children and slaves, or because they obey willingly, as do men who are good by nature. And moreover, the ancients had a name in common use for those who have not been chastised and disciplined in this very respect: that man, whoever he be, in whom it is clear that the power of reason has failed to discipline the concupiscible power is called an intractable or undisciplined man.

γίγνεται δ΄ ἡ κόλαι τῆ δυνάμεω ταύτη ἐν τῷ μὴ παρέχειν αὐτῇ τὴν τῶν ἐπιθυμουμένων ἀπόλαυιν· ἰχυρὰ μὲν γὰρ οὕτω καὶ μεγάλη γίγνεται͵ κολαθεῖα δὲ μικρά τε καὶ ἀθενή͵ ὡ ἔπεθαι τῷ λογιμῷ δι΄ ἀθένειαν͵ οὐ δι΄ εὐπείθειαν. οὕτω γοῦν καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὁρῶμεν ἑπομένου τοῖ βελ τίοι τοὺ χείρου͵ ἢ ἄκοντα βιαζομένου ὥπερ τὰ παιδία καὶ τοὺ οἰκέτα ἢ πειθέντα ἑκόντα ὥπερ τοὺ ἀγαθοὺ φύει. καὶ τοίνυν καὶ πρόρημα τῶν μὴ κολαθέντων αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο τοῖ παλαιοῖ ύνηθέ ἐτιν͵ ὡ ἀκόλατο ὅδε τι ἄνθρωπό ἐτιν͵ ἐφ΄ οὗ δηλονότι τὴν ἐπιθυμητικὴν δύναμιν οὐκ ἐκόλαεν ἡ λογιτική.

We have in our souls two irrational powers. The one [the irascible,] has for its task to become angry and wrathful on the spot with those who seem to have treated us ill in some way. It is also a function of this same power to cherish its wrath for a longer period since the passion of anger is greater in proportion to the length of time it endures. The other irrational power in us [the concupiscible] is the one by which we are carried forward to what appears to be pleasant before we have considered whether it is helpful and good or harmful and bad.

5.29 δύο γὰρ ἔχομεν ἐν ταῖ ψυχαῖ δυνάμει ἀλόγου͵ μίαν μέν͵ ἧ  τὸ θυμοῦθαί τε παραχρῆμα καὶ ὀργίζεθαι τοῖ δόξαί τι πλημμελεῖν εἰ ἡμᾶ ἔργον ἐτί. τῆ δ΄ αὐτῆ ταύτη καὶ τὸ μηνιᾶν ἄχρι πλείονο͵ ὃ τοούτῳ πλεῖόν ἐτι θυμοῦ πάθο͵ ὅῳ καὶ χρονιώτερον. ἄλλη δ΄ ἐτὶν ἐν ἡμῖν δύναμι ἄλογο ἐπὶ τὸ φαινόμενον ἡδὺ προπετῶ φερο μένη͵ πρὶν διακέψαθαι͵ πότερον ὠφέλιμόν ἐτι καὶ καλόν͵ ἢ βλαβερόν τε καὶ κακόν.

Strive to hold the impetuosity of this power in check before it grows and acquires an unconquerable strength. For then, even if you will to do so, you will not be able to hold it in check; then you will say what I heard a certain lover say—that you wish to stop but that you cannot—then you will call on us for help but in vain, just as that man begged for someone to help him and to cut out his passion. For there are also diseases of the body so intense that they are beyond cure.

ταύτη οὖν ἐπέχειν πειρῶ τὴν φοδρότητα͵ πρὶν αὐξη θεῖαν ἰχὺν δυνίκητον κτήαθαι. τηνικαῦτα γὰρ οὐδ΄ ἂν θελήῃ ἔτι καταχεῖν αὐτὴν δυνήῃ͵ κἄπειτα φήει͵ ὅπερ ἤκουά τινο ἐρῶντο͵ ἐθέλειν μὲν παύαθαι͵ μὴ δύναθαι δέ͵ παρακαλέει τε μάτην ἡμᾶ ὡαύτω ἐκείνῳ τῷ δεομένῳ βοηθῆαί τε καὶ τὸ πάθο ἐκκόψαι. καὶ γὰρ τῶν τοῦ ώματο παθῶν ἔνια διὰ μέγεθό ἐτιν ἀνίατα. ὺ δ΄ ἴω οὐδ΄ ἐνενόηά ποτε τοῦτο.

Perhaps you have never thought about this. It would be better, then, for you to think now and consider whether I am telling the truth when I say that the concupiscible power often waxes so strong that it hurls us into a love beyond all cure, a love not only for beautiful bodies and sexual pleasures but also for voluptuous eating, gluttony in food and drink, and for lewd, unnatural conduct, or if I am mistaken about these and many of the matters I spoke of before.

βέλτιον οὖν οι κἂν νῦν ἐννοῆαί γε καὶ διακέψαθαι͵ πότερον ἀληθεύω λέγων αὐξανομένην τὴν ἐπιθυμητικὴν δύναμιν εἰ ἀνίατον ἔρωτα πολλάκι ἐμβαλεῖν͵ οὐ ωμάτων μόνον ὡραίων οὐδ΄ ἀφροδιίων͵ ἀλλὰ καὶ λιχνεία  5.30 καὶ γατριμαργία οἰνοφλυγία τε καὶ τῆ παρὰ φύιν αἰχρουργία͵ ἢ ψεύδομαι καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν ἔμπροθεν εἰρημένων. ἃ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ θυμοῦ λέλεκται μέχρι τοῦ δεῦρο͵

Consider that what I said before about anger has also been said about the other diseases of the soul.

ταῦτα καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθῶν ἡγοῦ λελέχθαι·

[1] First, we must not leave the diagnosis of these passions to ourselves but we must entrust it to others;

πρῶτον μέν͵ ὡ ἑτέροι ἐτὶ τὴν διάγνωιν αὐτῶν ἐπιτρεπτέον͵ οὐχ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖ·

[2] second, we must not leave this task to anyone at all but to older men who are commonly considered to be good and noble — men to whom we ourselves have given full approval because, on many occasions, we have found them free from these passions.

εἶθ΄ ὅτι μὴ τοὺ τυχόντα τούτοι ἐπιτατέον͵ ἀλλὰ πρεβύτα ὁμολογουμένου μὲν εἶναι καλοὺ κἀγαθού͵ ἐξηταμένου δὲ καὶ πρὸ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπὶ πλέον ἐν ἐκείνοι τοῖ καιροῖ ἕνεκα τοῦ ἔξω παθῶν εἶναι·

[3] We must further show that we are grateful to these men and not annoyed with them when they mention any of our faults;

εἶθ΄ ὅτι φαίνεθαι χρὴ τοῖ τοιούτοι͵ ὅταν εἴπωί τι τῶν ἡμετέρων ἁμαρτη μάτων͵ οὐκ ἀγανακτοῦντα͵

[4] then, too, a man must remind himself of these things [three times] each day—if he does so frequently it will be all the better, but if not frequently, at least let him do so

ἀλλὰ χάριν εἰδότα͵ εἶτα ταῦτα καθ΄ ἑκάτην ἡμέραν αὑτὸν ἀναμιμνήκειν͵ ἄμεινον μὲν εἰ πολλάκι͵ εἰ δὲ μή͵ ἀλλὰ πάντω γε

at dawn,

κατὰ τὴν ἕω͵

before he begins his daily tasks,

πρὶν ἄρχεθαι τῶν πράξεων͵

and toward evening before he is about to rest.[7]

εἰ ἑπέραν δέ͵ πρὶν ἀναπαύεθαι μέλλειν.

You may be sure that I have grown accustomed to ponder twice a day the exhortations attributed to Pythagoras—first I read them over, then I recite them aloud.

ἐγὼ δήπου καὶ ταύτα δὴ τὰ φερομένα ὡ Πυθαγόρου παραινέει εἴθιμαι δὶ τῆ ἡμέρα ἀνα γινώκειν μὲν τὰ πρῶτα͵ λέγειν δ΄ ἀπὸ τόματο ὕτερον.

It is not enough for us to practice self-control over our anger; we must also cleanse ourselves of voluptuous eating, carnal lust, drunkenness, excessive curiosity, and envy. Let someone else keep watch over us to see that we are not seen greedily filling ourselves with food as dogs do, or, as do those who are on fire with a nonintermittent fever, that we do not lift the drink to our lips more greedily than becomes a man of dignity. For hunger is not a fitting reason to fill one’s belly greedily and to excess, nor does thirst justify draining the whole cup in a single gulp. A gluttonous appetite for everything in sight is a much less suitable reason for enjoying more than a small piece of pastry or some other dainty tidbit. Moreover, while we are novices in all these matters, we must ask others to watch over us and inform us of any error into which we fall; later on, let us, without our tutors’ help, keep watch over ourselves and be on our guard in order that we may take less to eat than those who are dining with us and that we may keep away from the dainty foods while we eat the healthful foods in moderation.

5.31 οὐ γὰρ ἀρκεῖ μόνον ἀοργηίαν ἀκεῖν͵ ἀλλὰ  καὶ λιχνεία καὶ λαγνεία οἰνοφλυγία τε καὶ περιεργία καὶ φθόνου καθαρεύειν. ἕτερο οὖν ἡμᾶ ἐπιτηρείτω͵ μή τί που͵ καθάπερ οἱ κύνε͵ ἀπλήτω ὤφθη μεν ἐμφορούμενοι ιτίων ἢ ὡ οἱ διακαιόμενοι πυρετῷ υνεχεῖ ψυχρὸν ἐπεπαάμεθα τὸ πόμα λαβρότερον ἢ ἀνδρὶ εμνῷ πρέπει. οὔτε γὰρ διὰ πεῖναν ἐμφορεῖθαι προήκει φοδρῶ καὶ ἀπλήτω͵ οὔτε διὰ δίψο ὅλην τὴν κύλικα χανδὸν ἐκπίνειν͵ ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον οὐδὲ διὰ λι χνείαν ἁπάντων τῶν παρόντων πλέον ἤτοι πλακοῦντο ἤ τινο ἄλλου τῶν λίχνων ὄψων ἀπολαύειν͵ ἀλλ΄ ἐν ἅπαιν τούτοι ἀρχομένοι μὲν ἔτι παρακλητέον ἐτὶν ἑτέρου ὅ τι ἂν ἁμάρτωμεν ἐπιτηρεῖν τε καὶ λέγειν ἡμῖν͵ ὕτερον δὲ καὶ χωρὶ παιδαγωγῶν ἡμᾶ αὐτοὺ ἐπι τηρῶμεν αὐτοὶ καὶ παραφυλάττωμεν͵ ὅπω ἁπάντων τε τῶν υνδει πνούντων ἔλαττον ὄψου προενεγκώμεθα καὶ τῶν λίχνων ἐδεμάτων ἀποχώμεθα͵ ύμμετρα τῶν ὑγιεινῶν προαράμενοι.

As time goes on, I would no longer ask you to look at your companions at the table, for it is no great task to eat and drink more temperately than they do; if, however, you have really learned how to judge yourself, consider whether you have lived a life of greater self-discipline yesterday or today. For if you will do this, you will perceive day by day that you are more content to keep away from the things of which I spoke; you will see that you will greatly gladden your soul, if indeed you will be a true lover of temperance. For any man is glad to make progress in that which he loves. Hence it is that we see that drunkards are glad when in drinking they outstrip those with whom they drink; gluttons are happy to surpass those who delight in the abundance of foods; the voluptuary in eating rejoices when he outdoes those who find their joy in cakes, in pots and pans, and in sacks for food. And I have known some men who were conceited about the large number of their sexual exploits.

τοῦ χρόνου δὲ προϊόντο οὐκέτ΄ οὐδὲ πρὸ τοὺ υνδειπνοῦντα 5.32 ἀποβλέπειν ἀξιώαιμ΄ ἄν ε· μέγα γὰρ οὐδὲν  ἐκείνων ἐθίειν τε καὶ πίνειν ἐγκρατέτερον. εἰ δέ περ ὄντω αὑτὸν ἔγνωκα τιμᾶν͵ ἐπι κέπτου͵ πότερον μᾶλλον [ποτε] ἐγκρατῶ διῄτηαι χθὲ ἢ τήμερον· ἐὰν γὰρ τοῦτο ποιῇ͵ αἰθήῃ καθ΄ ἑκάτην ἡμέραν εὐκολώτερον͵ ὧν εἶπον͵ ἀπεχόμενο͵ αἰθήῃ τε μεγάλα εὐφρανθηόμενο τὴν ψυχήν͵ ἐάν γε ωφρούνη ὄντω ἐρατὴ ὑπάρχῃ. ὅτου γὰρ ἄν τι ἐραθῇ͵ χαίρει προκόπτων ἐν αὐτῷ. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοὺ μὲν οἰνόφλυγα ἰδεῖν ἔτιν ἡδομένου͵ ὅταν πίνοντε ὑπερβάλωνται τοὺ υμπότα͵ ὅοι δὲ γατρίμαργοι͵ καὶ τούτου τῷ πλήθει τῶν ἐδεμάτων εὐφραινομένου͵ ὅοι δὲ λίχνοι͵ πλακοῦι καὶ ταγήνοι καὶ λοπάι καὶ κωρυκίοι. ἐνίου δὲ μέγα φρονοῦντα ἔγνων ἐπὶ τῷ πλήθει τῶν ἀφροδιίων.

Just as those men practice and pursue the height of the objects of their zeal, so must we zealously pursue the peak of temperance. If we shall do this, we will not compare ourselves to the undisciplined and intemperate, nor will it be enough to have more self-discipline and temperance than they. First, we will strive to surpass those who earnestly pursue this same virtue of temperance, for such rivalry is very noble; after them, let us strive to surpass ourselves, so that from long-continued custom we may enjoy using the foods which are both the most healthful and the easiest to provide as well as the most nourishing. Let us remind ourselves that this is one of the proverbs which is well said: “Choose the life which is best; living with it will make it pleasant.”[8]

ὡ οὖν ἐκεῖνοι τὴν ἀκρότητα τῶν πουδαζομένων ἀκοῦί τε καὶ μεταδιώκουιν͵ οὕτω καὶ ἡμᾶ χρὴ ωφρούνη ἀκρότητα που δάζειν. ἢν δὲ τοῦτο πράξωμεν͵ οὐ τοῖ ἀκολάτοι ἡμᾶ παραβαλοῦμεν οὐδ΄ ἀρκέει πλέον ἐκείνων ἔχειν ἐγκρατεία τε καὶ ωφρούνη͵ ἀλλὰ 5.33 πρῶτον μὲν τοὺ πουδάζοντα τὰ αὐτὰ φιλονεικήομεν  ὑπερβαλέθαι (καλλίτη γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη φιλονεικία)͵ μετ΄ ἐκείνου αὖθι δ΄ ἡμᾶ αὐτοὺ  ὡ ἐξ ἔθου πολυχρονίου τούτοι ὑγιεινοτάτοι τε [ἅμα] καὶ προθεῖναι ῥᾴτοι ἡδέω ἅμα τροφῇ χρῆθαι͵ μεμνημένου ὡ τῶν καλῶ εἰρημένων ἓν καὶ τοῦτ΄ ἐτίν· ἑλοῦ τὸν βίον ἄριτον͵ ἡδὺν δ΄ αὐτὸν ἡ υνήθεια ποιήει.

When I asked you to exercise yourself against your anger, you were able to see as a token of the benefit gained that you no longer were becoming angry.30 In the same way, let the fact that you no longer yearn for the things which are most pleasant be a token for you in the matter of temperance. The road to temperance is through self-discipline. It is in this very way that the temperate man holds an advantage over the man who has no command over himself: the temperate man no longer yearns for delicacies of the table, either because of long-standing habit or because of his self-control—as the very name shows, since it is derived from controlling and conquering one’s desires.

ὥπερ οὖν͵ ὁπότε πρὸ τὸν θυμὸν ἀκεῖν ἠξίουν ε͵ γνώριμα τῆ ὠφελεία εἶχε ὁρᾶν αυτὸν οὐκέτι θυμούμενον͵ ὡαύτω ἐπὶ τῆ ωφρούνη ἔτω οι γνώριμα μηδ΄ ἐπιθυμεῖν ἔτι τῶν ἡδίτων. ὁδὸ δ΄ ἐπ΄ αὐτήν ἐτι διὰ τῆ ἐγκρατεία. τούτῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ πλεονεκτεῖ ώφρων ἀκρατοῦ͵ τῷ μηδ΄ ἐπιθυμεῖν ἔτι λίχνων ἐδεμάτων ἢ διὰ πολυχρόνιον ἔθο ἢ δι΄ ἐγκράτειαν͵ καθάπερ καὶ αὐτὸ τοὔνομα αὐτῆ ἐνδείκνυται͵ ὅπερ ἐτὶν ἐκ τοῦ κρατεῖν καὶ νικᾶν τὰ ἐπιθυμία γεγονό.

To practice it is toilsome and difficult, at least at the beginning, but this is the case with every practice of a noble pursuit.

ἐπίπονο δ΄ ἐτὶ καὶ τραχεῖα τό γε κατ΄ ἀρχά͵ ὥπερ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι πᾶαι τῶν καλῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἀκήει.

If, therefore, you wish to have either virtue instead of wickedness or peace of soul instead of titillation of the body, you must exercise yourself in the aforementioned manner as you make your way to temperance through self-control. But if you decide either to dishonor virtue or to feel titillation through your whole body, then you must lay this discourse aside. It does not exhort to virtue; but for those who have been won over, it explains the way in which a man might acquire virtue.

εἰ μὲν οὖν ἤτοι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀντὶ τῆ κακία ἔχειν ἐθέλει ἢ τὴν γαλήνην τῆ ψυχῆ ἀντὶ  5.34 τῶν τοῦ ώματο γαργαλιμῶν͵ ἀκητέον ἐτί οι τὸν εἰρημένον τρό πον ἐπὶ ωφρούνην βαδίζοντι δι΄ ἐγκρατεία· εἰ δ΄ ἤτοι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀτιμάζειν ἢ γαργαλίζεθαι βούλει δι΄ ὅλου τοῦ ώματο͵ ἤδη κατα λειπτέον τὸν λόγον τοῦτον. οὐ γάρ ἐτι προτρεπτικὸ ἐπ΄ ἀρετήν͵

Although my discourse is divided into two parts, namely, how each of us becomes able to know himself, and how each may correct his errors when he has recognized them, I do not propose to speak about the correction, but rather about the recognition of one’s own errors. But since it is not possible for beginners to recognize these errors by themselves, we shall appoint others to watch over those who are beginning. These overseers will be themselves well trained and able to recognize the errors and passions from which they have been set free and to see what they still require for perfection.

ἀλλὰ τοῖ προτετραμμένοι ὑφηγητικὸ τῆ ὁδοῦ͵ καθ΄ ἣν ἄν τι αὐτὴν κτήαιτο. διαιρουμένου δὲ [καὶ] τοῦ λόγου πρό τε τὸ διαγνωτικὸν ἕκατον ἡμῶν ὑπάρχειν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ πρὸ τὴν ἐπὶ τῇ διαγνώει τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων ἐπανόρθωιν οὐ περὶ ταύτη πρόκειται λέγειν͵ ἀλλὰ περὶ διαγνώεω τῶν ἰδίων ἁμαρτημάτων. ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῖ [μὲν] ἀρχομένοι αὐτοῖ οὐ διαγνῶναι δυνατόν͵ ἑτέρου μὲν τοῖ ἀρχομένοι ἐπιτήομεν ἐπόπτα͵ αὐτοὺ δ΄ ἑαυτοῖ τοὺ ἀκοῦντα͵ ὡ ἂν ἤδη δυναμένοι γνῶναι͵ ποίων μὲν ἀπηλλάγηαν ἁμαρτημάτων καὶ παθῶν͵ ὅ τι δ΄ αὐτοῖ ἐνδεῖ πρὸ τὸ τέλο.

I shall also say now what I am in the habit of saying on every occasion: in one way, it is the most difficult of all things for a man to know himself; in another, it is the easiest. {For if a man wishes to have a knowledge of his inner self, he must work very hard to obtain it; if he desires only a surface knowledge, this will be his with practically no effort at all.}[9]

ὅπερ δ΄ εἴωθα λέγειν ἑκάτοτε͵ καὶ νῦν ἐρῶ· καθ΄ ἕτερον μὲν τρόπον ἁπάντων ἐτὶ δυκολώτατον ἑαυ τὸν γνῶναι͵ καθ΄ ἕτερον δὲ ῥᾷτον. ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ ὄντω θέλῃ τι τιμηθῆναι ..... αὐτό͵ χαλεπώτατόν ἐτιν. 

VII

 

And so, in response to your wish, I set down the sum total of all I have said and all I am going to say. Although there may be some other way by which a man becomes good and noble, I do not know how to discover it. Hence, I personally followed this way throughout my whole life, and I did not begrudge explaining it to others; in fact, I urged them to change places with me and to instruct me if they knew of some other way to become noble and good. But until we come across some other way, let us busy ourselves with this method which is the usual one for recognizing and curing all diseases of the soul. For obstinacy, love of glory, lust for power are diseases of the soul. Greediness is less harmful than these, but it, too, is, nevertheless, a disease. And what must I say of envy? It is the worst of evils. I call it envy whenever someone is grieved over the success of others. All grief is a disease, and envy is the worst grief, whether we call it a passion or a kind of pain which borders on grief.

5.35 Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἅπαντα τά τ΄ εἰρημένα καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα λεχθή εθαι τοῖ βουληθεῖιν ὑποτίθεμαι. τάχα μὲν οὖν οὔη καὶ ἄλλη τινὸ ὁδοῦ πρὸ τὸ καλὸν κἀγαθὸν γενέθαι͵ μὴ γιγνώκων δ΄ εὑρεῖν αὐτὸ ἐχρηάμην τε δι΄ ὅλου τοῦ βίου ταύτῃ καὶ τοῖ ἄλλοι ἀφθό νω ἐδήλουν παρακαλῶν ἀντιδιδόναι τε καὶ ἀντονινάναι τι καὶ ἀντι διδάκειν͵ εἴ τιν΄ ἑτέραν [ἄλλην] αὐτοὶ γιγνώκουι καλοκἀγαθία ὁδόν͵ ἀλλ΄ ἄχρι περ ἂν ἐπιτύχωμεν ἄλλη͵ ἐν τῇδε διατρίβωμεν͵ ἣ κοινὴ πάντων διαγνώεώ τε καὶ θεραπεία. καὶ γὰρ ἡ φιλονεικία καὶ ἡ φιλοδοξία καὶ ἡ φιλαρχία πάθη τῆ ψυχῆ εἰι. τούτων δ΄ ἔλαττον μὲν ἡ ἀπλητία͵ ἀλλ΄ ὅμω καὶ αὐτὴ πάθο. περὶ δὲ τοῦ φθόνου τί δεῖ καὶ λέγειν; ἔχατον τῶν κακῶν ἐτιν· ὀνομάζω δὲ φθόνον͵ ὅταν τι ἐπ΄ ἀλλοτρίοι ἀγαθοῖ λυπῆται. πάθο μέν ἐτι καὶ λύπη πᾶα͵ χειρίτη δὲ ὁ φθόνο ἐτίν͵ εἴτε ἓν τῶν παθῶν εἴτε λύπη ἐτὶν εἶδο πληιάζον δέ πω αὐτῇ·

But the method of cure which I have mentioned is in all cases the common one. We must observe what is shameful and to be shunned in the instances of those who are caught in the violent grip of these diseases, for in such men the disgrace is clearly seen. But we must not think that we do not have our share of disgrace because we do not see it in ourselves. The lover is blind with respect to what he loves; (Plato, Laws, 731e) the insignificant vices which we overlook in ourselves because of our blindness cannot be overlooked in others because they are so large.

κοινὴ δ΄ ἐφ΄ ἁπάντων ὁδὸ τῆ ἰάεω 5.36 ἡ προειρημένη. χρὴ γάρ͵ ὅτι  μὲν αἰχρὸν καὶ φευκτόν͵ κατανοεῖν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐνεχομένων αὐτοῖ φοδρῶ· ἐναργὲ γὰρ ἐπ΄ ἐκείνων φαίνεται τὸ αἶχο· ὅτι δ΄ οὐ βλέπομεν ἐφ΄ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν͵ μηδ΄ εἶναι νομίζειν οὐ προήκει· τυφλώττει τε γὰρ τὸ φιλοῦν [εἴτε] περὶ τὸ φιλούμενον͵ ἔνιά τε λανθάνει διὰ μικρότητα καὶ παρορᾶται͵ μὴ δυνάμενα παρο φθῆναι διὰ τὸ μέγεθο ἐν ἄλλοι.

Hence, we must find some mature person who can see these vices and urge him to reveal with frankness all our errors. Next, when he tells us of some fault, let us, first, be immediately grateful to him; then, let us go aside and consider the matter by ourselves; let us censure ourselves and try to cut away the disease, not only to the point where it is not apparent to others, but so completely as to remove its roots from our soul. For if it is not removed, it will be watered by the wickedness of the other diseases dwelling in the soul and sprout up again. Therefore, we ourselves must pay attention to each of the diseases which we notice in our neighbors to see if any of these ills are in our own soul. For this disease must be cut out while it is still sprouting and before it has become so large as to be incurable.

πρεβύτην οὖν τινα βλέπειν αὐτὰ δυνάμενον εὑρίκειν προήκει παρακαλοῦντα ἅπαντα μετὰ παρρηία δηλοῦν͵ εἶτ΄ εἰπόντο τι͵ πρῶτον αὐτῷ χάριν μὲν γνῶναι παραυτίκα͵ χωριθέντα δὲ διακέπτεθαι κατὰ μόνα ἑαυτοῖ ἐπιτιμῶντα ἐκκό πτειν τε πειρωμένου τὸ πάθο͵ οὐκ ἄχρι τοῦ μὴ φαίνεθαι τοῖ ἄλλοι μόνον͵ ἀλλ΄ ὥτε μηδὲ ῥίζαν ἐγκαταλιπεῖν αὐτοῦ τῇ ψυχῇ· ἔτι γὰρ ἀναφύεται τῇ τῶν υζώντων ἀρδόμενον πονηρίᾳ. διὰ τοῦτο προεκτέον ἡμῖν αὐτοῖ ἐτιν ἐφ΄ ἑκάτῳ τῶν παθῶν͵ ὅα περὶ τοὺ πέλα ἐπι κοποῦμεν͵ εἴ τι κατὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἐτὶ ψυχὴν τοιοῦτον. ἐκκοπτέον 5.37 γὰρ αὐτὸ φυόμενον ἔτι͵ πρὶν αὐξηθὲν ἀνίατον  γενέθαι.

Most men look with scorn upon all the other diseases of the soul, and so they fail to observe them when they see other men who are affected by them. But no one fails to see clearly that grief is an evil of the soul, just as pain is an evil for the body.

τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἁπάντων παθῶν τῆ ψυχῆ οἱ πολλοὶ καταφρο νοῦι͵ καίτοι γε͵ ὅταν ἑτέρου αὐτὰ πάχοντα ἴδωι͵ καταγινώκοντε͵ ἡ λύπη δ΄ ἅπαι φαίνεται κακόν͵ ὥπερ ὁ πόνο ἐν τῷ ώματι.

When one of the young men with whom I was quite well acquainted was distressed over a small matter and had noticed this one evening, he came to me at dawn and said that he had been awake all night because of this, until he remembered that I was not as distressed over very important matters as he was over small ones. He wanted to know how I excelled him in this, whether it was the result of practice, or of principles I held, or because I was such by nature. And so I told him the truth. I told him that, in the age of boyhood, nature is in all cases a great factor, as is also imitation of those about us; later on, principles and practice are important influences.

καί τι τῶν υνηθετάτων ἐμοὶ νεανίκων ἐπὶ μικροῖ ἀνιώμενο͵ ἐ ἑπέραν ποτὲ κατανοήα τοῦτο͵ παραγενόμενο πρό με κατὰ βα θὺν ὄρθρον ὅλη ἔφη τῆ νυκτὸ ἀγρυπνῶν ἐπὶ τῷδε τῷ πράγματι μεταξύ πω εἰ ἀνάμνηιν ἀφικέθαι μου μηδ΄ ἐπὶ τοῖ μεγίτοι οὕτω ἀνιωμένου͵ ὡ ἐπὶ τοῖ μικροῖ αὐτό. ἠξίου δ΄ οὖν μαθεῖν͵ ὅπω μοι τοῦτο περιεγένετο͵ πότερον ἐξ ἀκήεω ἤ τινων δογμάτων ἢ φύντι τοιούτῳ. ἀπεκρινάμην οὖν [τ΄] αὐτῷ τἀληθῆ. καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὴν φύιν ἐν ἅπαιν ἔφην [εἰ] δύναθαι μέγα ἐν τῇ τῶν παιδίων ἡλικίᾳ καὶ τὴν τοῖ υζῶιν ὁμοίωιν͵ εἶθ΄ ὕτερον τά τε δόγματα καὶ τὴν ἄκηιν.

That our individual natures are entirely different we can learn clearly from the children who are brought to our attention. Some of them are always radiant and smiling, others are always sullen and sad; some are ready to laugh at everything, others are ready to weep at the least pretext; some share (all) they have, others hoard everything; some become angry over the smallest things so that they bite and kick and take vengeance on their neighbors with sticks and stones when they think they have been unjustly treated, others are forbearing and mild, neither growing angry nor crying until they have suffered some great injustice. And so Eupolis, the comic poet, represented Aristides the Just as being asked this question:

ὅτι μὲν οὖν αἱ φύει ἡμῶν πάμπολυ διαφέρουι͵ μαθεῖν ἐν αργῶ ἔτιν ἐπὶ τῶν παραφερομένων παιδίων. ἔνια μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν 5.38 ἀεὶ φαιδρά͵ κυθρωπὰ δ΄ ἄλλα θεώμεθα͵ καὶ  τὰ μὲν ἕτοιμα γελᾶν ἐπὶ πᾶι͵ τὰ δὲ κλαίειν ἐπὶ μικραῖ προφάειν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὰ μὲν ἅπαντ΄ ἔχει κοινῇ͵ τὰ δ΄ ἁρπάζει. καὶ τὰ μὲν θυμοῦται φοδρῶ ἐπὶ τῶν μικροτάτων͵ ὡ δάκνειν τε καὶ λακτίζειν καὶ λίθοι καὶ ξύλοι ἀμύναθαι τοὺ πέλα͵ ὅταν ἀδικεῖθαι δόξῃ͵ τὰ δ΄ ἐτὶν ἀνεξίκακα καὶ πρᾶα͵ μήτ΄ ὀργιζόμενα μήτε κλαίοντα͵ πρὶν ἀδικηθῆναί τι μέγα. ταῦτ΄ ἄρα καὶ ὁ Εὔπολι ἐρωτώμενον Ἀριτείδην τὸν Δίκαιον ὑπὸ τοῦ  ἠτον

Through what influence did you become so outstandingly just?

τί παθὼν ἐγένου δίκαιο οὕτω διαπρεπῶ;

and then showed him replying:

ἀποκρινόμενον ἐποίηεν·

Nature was the strongest factor, but then I lent nature a ready hand.[10]

ἡ μὲν φύι τὸ μέγιτον ἦν· ἔπειτα δὲ κἀγὼ προθύμω τῇ φύει υνελάμβανον.

Not only, then, are the natures of the young predisposed to grief but they are also readily inclined to anger and sumptuous eating, passions which I have spoken about at length up to now. Besides the types of young men I have already mentioned, you can see some who are shameless, others who are respectful; some have good memories, others are unmindful and forget; some work hard at their studies while others are careless and lazy; among those who work hard some are ready to rejoice when praised, others blush when their teachers find fault with them, and still others are ashamed when they are punished; so also among the lazy, you can see that each one has a different reason for his indolence.

οὐ μόνον οὖν ἕτοιμοι τῶν νέων αἱ φύει πρὸ τὸ λυπεῖθαι ῥᾳδίω͵ ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸ τὸ θυμοῦθαι καὶ λιχνεύειν͵ ὑπὲρ ὧν ἄχρι δεῦρο τὸν πλεῖτον λόγον ἐποιηάμην. ἔτι δὲ πρὸ τοῖ εἰρημένοι ἔτιν ἰδεῖν ἔνια μὲν ἀναίχυντα τῶν παιδίων͵ ἔνια δ΄ αἰδούμενα καὶ τὰ μὲν μνη μονικά͵ τὰ δ΄ ἀμνήμονα͵ τινὰ δ΄ ἐπιλήμονα καὶ τὰ μὲν φιλόπονα περὶ τὰ διδακόμενα͵ τὰ δ΄ ἀμελῆ καὶ ῥᾴθυμα͵ καὶ τῶν φιλοπόνων ἔνια 5.39 μὲν [ἐπὶ τῷ] χαίρειν ἐπαινούμενα  πρόθυμα͵ ἔνια δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ κατα γινώκεθαι πρὸ τῶν διδακάλων αἰδήμονα͵ τινὰ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ δεδιέναι πληγά. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῶν ῥᾳθύμων ἐπὶ ταῖ ἐναντίαι αἰτίαι ἕκατόν ἐτι ῥᾳθυμοῦν.

Therefore, all who observe children call some modest and others shameless. In the same way, they call them either ambitious and lovers of beauty and goodness, or say that they are indifferent to honor, beauty, and goodness. They further say they are either cowards or contemptuous of blows; and they put other such names on them according to their natures. In this way, then, we see that some children are naturally truthful or liars and have many other differences of character about which there is now, in all likelihood, no need to speak, because some of these children are very easily educated while others benefit not at all. We must not, on that account, neglect the young, but we must rear them in the best habits. If their nature will accept the advantage of our care, they could become good men. If they should fail to accept this attention, the blame would not be ours.

ἐξ ὧν οὖν ἂν θεῶνται περὶ τὰ παιδία πάντε ἄνθρωποι͵ τὰ μὲν αἰχυντηλὰ καλοῦιν αὐτῶν͵ τὰ δ΄ ἀναίχυντα. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ἤτοι φιλότιμα καὶ φιλόκαλα ἢ ἀφιλότιμα καὶ ἀφιλόκαλα͵ καὶ μὴν δειλὰ ἢ καταφρονητικὰ πληγῶν͵ ἑτέρα τε τοιαύτα ἐπ΄ αὐτῶν τίθενται προηγορία κατὰ τὰ φύει αὐτῶν. οὕτω οὖν καὶ τὰ μὲν φιλοψευδῆ͵ τὰ δὲ φιλαλήθη τῶν παιδίων ὁρῶμεν ὄντα φύει καὶ πολ λὰ ἄλλα ἔχοντα διαφορὰ ἠθῶν͵ ὑπὲρ ὧν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖόν ἐτι νῦν λέγειν εἰκότω· ἔνια μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ῥᾴτου δέχεται τὴν ἀγαθὴν παιδείαν͵ ἔνια δ΄ οὐδὲν ὀνίναται. οὐ μὴν τούτου γ΄ ἕνεκεν ἀμελητέον ἐτὶ τῶν παιδίων͵ ἀλλ΄ ἐν ἀρίτοι ἔθει θρεπτέον. ἢν μὲν ἡ φύι αὐτῶν δέξηται τὴν ἐκ τῆ ἐπιμελεία ὠφέλειαν͵ ἀγαθοὶ γενηθεῖεν ἂν 5.40 ἄνδρε. εἰ δὲ μὴ δέξαιτό που͵  τὸ μὲν ἡμέτερον ἂν ἄμεμπτον εἴη.

The education of children in some way closely resembles horticulture. For all his careful attention, the farmer could never make a bramble bush produce a bunch of grapes. To begin with, the nature of the bush does not admit such a perfection. Again, even though vines may in themselves be fruitful, they will produce inferior fruit or none at all if the farmer has neglected them and left them to nature alone. The same is true of animals. If you train a horse, you will have an animal that is useful for many things; but even if at times a bear appears tame, it does not constantly maintain this mild mood, whereas the viper and the scorpion never go so far as to give the appearance of being tame.

παραπληία γάρ πώ ἐτιν ἡ τῶν παίδων διαγωγὴ τῇ τῶν φυτῶν ἐπιμελείᾳ. κατ΄ ἐκείνην γοῦν ὁ γεωργὸ οὐκ ἄν ποτε δυνήαιτο ποιῆαι τὸν βάτον ἐκφέρειν βότρυν· οὐ γὰρ ἐπιδέχεται ἡ φύι αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην τελείωιν. ἀμπέλου δ΄ αὖ πάλιν ἑτοίμα οὔα ὅον ἐφ΄ ἑαυτῶν καρπὸν ἐκφέρειν͵ ἐὰν ἀμελήα ἐπιτρέψῃ μόνῃ τῇ φύει͵ μοχθηρὸν ἢ οὐδ΄ ὅλω οἴουιν αὐτόν. οὕτω δὲ κἀπὶ τῶν ζῴων ἵππον μὲν παιδεύα εἰ πολλὰ χρήιμον ἕξει͵ ἄρκτο δέ͵ κἂν ἡμέρα ποτὲ δόξῃ͵ μόνιμον οὐκ ἔχει τὴν ἕξιν͵ ἔχιδνα δὲ καὶ κορπίο οὐδ΄ ἄχρι τοῦ δο κεῖν ἡμεροῦθαι προέρχεται.

VIII

 

I am not qualified to say what kind of nature I had as a boy—to know oneself is a difficult thing for full-grown men, much less for boys—but I did enjoy the good fortune of having the least irascible, the most just, the most devoted, and kindest of fathers.3 8 My mother, however, was so very prone to anger that sometimes she bit her handmaids; she constantly shrieked at my father and fought with him—more than Xanthippe did with Socrates. When I compared my father’s noble deeds with the disgraceful passions of my mother, I decided to embrace and love his deeds and to flee and hate her passions. Just as in these respects I saw the utter difference between my parents, so also did I see it in the fact that my father (seemed) never to be grieved over any loss, whereas my mother was vexed over the smallest things. Surely, you know, too, that children imitate the things in which they take pleasure but that they shun the things on which they look with disgust.

Ἐγὼ τοίνυν͵ ὅπω μὲν τὴν φύιν εἶχον͵ οὐκ ἔχω φάναι (τὸ γὰρ ἑαυτὸν γνῶναι χαλεπόν ἐτι καὶ τοῖ τελείοι ἀνδράι͵ μή τί γε δὴ τοῖ παιίν)͵ εὐτύχηα δὲ μεγάλην εὐτυχίαν͵ ἀοργητότατον μὲν καὶ δικαιότατον καὶ χρητότατον καὶ φιλανθρωπότατον ἔχων πατέρα͵ μη 5.41 τέρα δ΄ ὀργιλωτάτην͵ ὡ δάκνειν μὲν  ἐνίοτε τὰ θεραπαίνα͵ ἀεὶ δὲ κεκραγέναι τε καὶ μάχεθαι τῷ πατρὶ μᾶλλον ἢ Ξανθίππη Σ3ωκράτει. παράλληλά τε ὁρῶντί μοι τὰ καλὰ τῶν τοῦ πατρὸ ἔργων τοῖ αἰχροῖ πάθει τῆ μητρὸ ἐπῄει τὰ μὲν ἀπάζεθαί τε καὶ φιλεῖν͵ τὰ δὲ φεύγειν καὶ μιεῖν. ὥπερ δ΄ ἐν τούτοι ἑώρων παμπόλλην διαφορὰν τῶν γονέων͵ οὕτω κἀν τῷ φαίνεθαι τὸν μὲν ἐπὶ μηδεμιᾷ ζημίᾳ λυπούμενον͵ ἀνιωμένην δ΄ ἐπὶ μικροτάτοι τὴν μητέρα. γινώκει δὲ δήπου καὶ ὺ τοὺ παῖδα͵ οἷ μὲν ἂν ἡθῶι͵ ταῦτα μιμουμένου͵ ἃ δ΄ ἂν ἀηδῶ ὁρῶι φεύγοντα.

Such, then, was the training I received under my father. After I had completed my fourteenth year, I attended lectures by philosophers from my own city—mostly under a Stoic who was a disciple of Philopator,4° but for a short time, also, under a Platonist, a disciple of Gaius. Gaius himself no longer had leisure for teaching because his fellow-citizens forced him to hold public offices, since he alone was, in their judgment, just, above the lure of wealth, affable, and gentle. Meanwhile, I studied under another teacher from my home town, a disciple of Aspasius the Peripatetic, on his return from a long sojourn abroad. After him, I had another teacher from Athens, an Epicurean. For my sake, my father made a close investigation of the lives and doctrines of all these men and went along with me to hear them. But my father’s training lay chiefly in the sciences of geometry, arithmetic, architecture, and astronomy. Therefore, since he liked to talk after the fashion of geometrical demonstrations, (he believed that) one who taught (other disciplines should) use (a similar method of presentation).[11] For this reason, he said that there was no need for my teachers in the liberal disciplines to disagree with one another, just as there was no disagreement among the teachers of old in the aforementioned sciences, of which geometry and arithmetic are the foremost.

ἡ μὲν οὖν ὑπὸ τῷ πατρὶ παιδεία τοιαύτη τι ἦν· ὑποπληρώα δὲ τετταρεκαιδέκατον ἔτο ἤκουον φιλοόφων πολιτῶν͵ ἐπὶ πλεῖτον μὲν Σ3τωϊκοῦ͵ φιλοπάτορο μαθητοῦ͵ βραχὺν δέ τινα χρόνον καὶ Πλατωνικοῦ͵ μαθητοῦ Γαΐου͵ διὰ τὸ μὴ χολάζειν αὐτὸν εἰ πολιτικὰ ἀχολία ἑλκόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν͵ ὅτι μόνο αὐτοῖ ἐφαίνετο δίκαιό τε καὶ χρημάτων εἶναι κρείττων͵ εὐπρόιτό τε καὶ 5.42 πρᾶο. ἐν τούτῳ δέ τι καὶ ἄλλο ἧκε πολίτη ἡμέτερο  ἐξ ἀποδη μία μακρᾶ͵ Ἀπαίου τοῦ Περιπατητικοῦ μαθητή͵ καὶ μετὰ τοῦτον ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ἄλλο Ἐπικούρειο͵ ὧν ἁπάντων ὁ πα τὴρ δι΄ ἐμὲ τοῦ τε βίου καὶ τῶν δογμάτων ἐξέταιν ἐποιεῖτο ὺν ἐμοὶ πρὸ αὐτοὺ ἀφικνούμενο. ἐγεγύμνατο δ΄ ἐπὶ πλεῖτον ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ καὶ ἀριθμητικῇ καὶ ἀρχιτεκτονίᾳ καὶ ἀτρονομίᾳ. βουλόμενο οὖν ὅμοια ταῖ γραμμικαῖ ἀποδείξει λέγειν χρῆθαι ... τὸν διδάξαντα. διὰ ταύτην δ΄ ἐχρῆν τὴν αἰτίαν μηδὲ διαφωνίαν τινὰ γεγονέναι πρὸ ἀλλήλου τοῖ ἀπὸ τῶν οῦ δῆλον ὅτι μαθημάτων καλῶν͵ καθάπερ οἱ ἀρχαῖοι κατὰ τὰ προειρημένα τέχνα͵ ὧν αἱ πρῶται γεωμετρία τε καὶ ἀριθμητική͵ υμφωνοῦιν ἀλλήλοι.

He went on to say that I must not be hasty in proclaiming myself a member of one sect, but that I must inquire, learn, and form my judgment about these sects over a considerable period of time. He also maintained that I must strive, now and throughout my life, to pursue those practices which all men praised and which the philosophers agreed must be emulated. He asked me to learn and wax strong while seeking after justice, temperance, fortitude, and prudence. All men praise these virtures and, even if they themselves are aware that they do not possess any one of them, they strive, at least, to appear in the eyes of other men as brave, temperate, prudent, and just; however, when it comes to grief, they try to be truly free from it, whether they appear so to their neighbors or not. Hence, he told me that I must, above all things, practice this serenity which all men pursue more eagerly than they pursue virtue.

καθάπερ οὖν͵ ἔφη͵ δεῖ μὴ προπετῶ ἀπὸ μιᾶ αἱρέεω ἀναγορεύειν εαυτόν͵ ἀλλ΄ ἐν χρόνῳ παμπόλλῳ μανθάνειν τε καὶ κρίνειν αὐτά͵ οὕτω ἃ πρὸ ἁπάντων μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἐπαινεῖται͵ υνομολογεῖται δὲ καὶ τοῖ φιλο όφοι εἶναι ζηλωτέα͵ ταῦτα καὶ νῦν ἤδη καὶ διὰ παντὸ τοῦ βίου ζηλωτέον ἀκεῖν͵ καὶ μανθάνειν καὶ αὐξάνειν ἀξιῶ ε δικαιούνη ἀντιποιούμενον καὶ ωφρούνη ἀνδρεία τε καὶ φρονήεω. ἐπαι 5.43 νοῦι γὰρ ἅπαντε  τὰ ἀρετὰ ταύτα͵ κἂν αὐτοὶ υνειδῶιν ἑαυ τοῖ οὐδεμίαν αὐτῶν ἔχουι͵ καὶ φαίνεθαί γε πειρῶνται τοῖ ἄλλοι ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ ώφρονε καὶ φρόνιμοι καὶ δίκαιοι͵ ἄλυποι μέντοι κατ΄ ἀλήθειαν εἶναι͵ κἂν μὴ φαίνωνται τοῖ πέλα· ὥτε τοῦτο μέν οι πρῶτον ἁπάντων ἀκητέον ἐτὶ τὸ πουδαζόμενον ἅπαιν ἀνθρώποι μᾶλλον τῶν ἀρετῶν.

These, I said, were the injunctions I received from my father, and I have observed them up to the present day. I did not proclaim myself a member of any of those sects of which, with all earnestness, I made a careful examination, but I continued undaunted in the face of day by day occurrences throughout my life, just as I had seen my father do. No loss was enough to cause me grief. I do not know if I would grieve if I should lose all my possessions, for I have never yet experienced such a large loss. My father also accustomed me to look with scorn on glory and honor and to hold only the truth in esteem. But I see many men grieving when they think that someone has dishonored them or because of the loss of money. In a matter of this sort, you would never see me grieving, unless I incurred a loss of money so great that I was no longer able with what was left to take care of my bodily health, or unless I incurred some dishonor such as I see in the case of those who have been deprived of the honor of their seats in the Council. If I should hear that some men find fault with me, I oppose to them those who praise me, and I consider that the desire to have all men praise me is like the desire to possess all things.

ταύτα͵ ἔφην͵ ἐγὼ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸ λαβὼν τὰ ἐντολὰ ἄχρι δεῦρο διαφυλάττω͵ μήτ΄ ἀφ΄ αἱρέεώ τινο ἐμαυτὸν ἀναγορεύα͵ ὧν πουδῇ πάῃ ἀκριβῆ τὴν ἐξέταιν ἔχω͵ ἀνέκπληκτό τε πρὸ τὰ κατὰ τὸν βίον ὁημέραι υμπίπτοντα διαμένων͵ ὥπερ ἑώρων τὸν πατέρα. οὔτ΄ οὖν ἀπώλειά τινο ἱκανὴ λυπῆαί με͵ πλὴν εἰ παντελῶ ἀπο λέαιμι τὰ κτήματα (τοῦτο γὰρ οὐδέπω πεπείραμαι)͵ δόξη τε καὶ τι μῆ ὁ πατὴρ εἴθιέ με καταφρονεῖν ἀλήθειαν μόνην τιμῶντα. λυπου μένου δ΄ ὁρῶ τοὺ πολλού͵ ὅταν ἠτιμάθαι δοκῶιν ὑπό τινο͵ ἢ χρημάτων ἀπωλείᾳ. κατὰ τοῦτ΄ οὖν͵ ἔφην͵ οὐδὲ λυπούμενον εἶδέ μέ ποτε͵ εἴ γε μήτε χρημάτων ἀπώλεια υνέπεέ μοι μέχρι δεῦρο 5.44 τηλικαύτη τὸ μέγεθο͵ ὡ μηκέτ΄ ἔχειν  ἐκ τῶν ὑπολοίπων ἐπιμελεῖ θαι τοῦ ώματο ὑγιεινῶ͵ μήτ΄ ἀτιμία τι͵ ὡ ὁρῶ τοὺ τοῦ υνεδρίου τῆ τιμῆ [βουλῆ] ἀφαιρεθέντα. εἰ δέ τινα ἀκούαιμι ψέγειν με͵ τού μ΄ ἐπαινοῦντα αὐτοῖ ἀντιτίθημι καὶ νομίζω τὸ πάν τα ἀνθρώπου ἐπαινοῦντα ἐπιθυμεῖν ἔχειν ἐοικέναι τῷ τὰ πάντα ἔχειν ἐθέλειν κτήματα.

Furthermore, I said, I think and I believe you think,too, that it is because I have up to the present endured no great suffering that I am perfectly free from pain and grief. It is true that I have neither been deprived of all my possessions nor have I suffered any dishonor. But if an ox or a horse or a slave died, this loss was not enough to cause me grief, because I remembered the counsel given me by my father when he advised me not to grieve over the loss of possessions—as long as what was left was enough to take care of my bodily needs.

δοκῶ τοίνυν͵ ἔφην͵ ἐμαυτῷ͵ τάχα δὲ καὶ οὶ δόξω διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἄχρι δεῦρο μέγα πεπονθέναι διὰ τέλου ἄλυπο. οὔτε γὰρ ἀφῃρέθην ἁπάντων τῶν χρημάτων οὔτ΄ ἠτιμώθην. εἰ δὲ βοῦ ἢ ἵππο ἢ οἰκέτη ἀπέθανεν͵ οὐχ ἱκανὸν τοῦτο λυπῆαί με μεμνημένον ὧν ὁ πατὴρ ὑπέθετο͵ μὴ πρότερον ἐπὶ χρημάτων ἀπω λείᾳ λυπηθῆναι υμβουλεύων͵ ἄχρι μὴ ἂν ᾖ τὰ λειπόμενα πρὸ τὴν τοῦ ώματο ἐπιμέλειαν αὐτάρκη.

This is what he laid down as the basic standard for possessions, namely, not to be hungry, not to be cold, not to be thirsty. If you should have more than is necessary for these, you must, he said, use that surplus for good works. Up to now, the goods I have possessed have been sufficient for these good works. But I know, I said, that you have twice as much as I and that you are in possession of your rights and franchises in our city, so that I do not see what could be a cause of grief for you except insatiate desire and greed. Therefore, practice what I have said in my discourse; keep it in mind, study it, and consider whether I am telling the truth until you are just as convinced of this as you are that two times two are four.

τοῦτον γὰρ ἐτίθετο πρῶτον ὅρον ἐκεῖνο κτημάτων͵ ὡ μὴ πεινῆν͵ μὴ ῥιγοῦν͵ μὴ διψῆν. εἰ δὲ πλείω τῆ εἰ ταῦτα χρεία εἴη͵ καὶ πρὸ τὰ καλὰ πράξει͵ ἔφη͵ χρητέον αὐτοῖ. ἐμοὶ τοίνυν ἄχρι δεῦρο τοαύτη χρημάτων κτῆί ἐτιν͵ ὡ 5.45 καὶ πρὸ τὰ τοιαύτα  πράξει ἐξαρκεῖν. οἶδα δέ͵ ἔφην͵ καὶ ὲ δι πλάιά τ΄ ἐμοῦ κεκτημένον͵ ἐπίτιμόν τε κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν ὄνθ΄͵ ὡ͵ τί ἂν εἴη οι λύπη αἰτία πλὴν ἀπλητία͵ οὐχ ὁρῶ. πρὸ ταύ την οὖν ἄκηον τὸν λόγον͵ ὃν εἶπον ἐγώ͵ διὰ μνήμη ἔχων καὶ μελετῶν ἀεὶ καὶ κοπούμενο͵ εἰ ἀληθεύω͵ μέχρι περ ἂν τούτῳ πει θῇ ὡ τῷ τὰ δὶ δύο τέτταρα εἶναι.

 


 

[1] See E. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen (3 vols. in 6; Leipzig: O. R. Reisland, 1903-22) , III, Part 1, p. 389, n. 3.

[2] See Galen, De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis (Leipzig: Teubner, 1874) , pp. 341, 9 ff.; 342, 11 ff.; 367, 10; 407, 14 ff.

[3] See Galen, De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis, pp. 401, 7 ff.; 436, 7 ff.; 476, 15 ff.

[4] See Fables, ed. C. Halm (Leipzig: Teubner, 1889), p. 359; and also Babrius, Fables, ed. O. Crusius (Leipzig: Teubner, 1897) , 66, pp. 59-60.

[5] See De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis, p. 495, 1 ff.

[6] See Carmen aureum, ed. E. Diehl, in Anthologia Lyrica (Leipzig: Teubner, 1923) , XII, ii. 186.

[7] See verses 40 ff. of Carmen Aureum (Anthologia lyrica graeca, Vol. II) , p. 86.

[8] Pythagoras, quoted by Stobaeus, Anthologium, II, i. 29, p. 14; xxix. 99, p. 659.

[9] The text between the angular brackets is mutilated and contains a lacuna. The translation represents what appears to be a conjecture embodied in the Latin translation given in Kuehn’s edition of 1825.

[10] Fragment 91 in T. Kock, Comicorum Atticorum fragmenta (3 vols.; Leipzig: Teubner, 1880-88) , I, p. 280.

[11] The Greek text is defective. Several emendations seem necessary, but those which have been tried have not been successful. The translator has not attempted to restore the text but to supply the sense of the lacuna by means of the words in angular brackets. It must be noted that the defects of this sentence make the meaning of the following sentence obscure.

and handed him over to them.


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